

**EFFECTS ON THE JOINT PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE OF OBLIGATION
AND EXPENDITURE GOALS OF THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

GAIL SOUBIE



May 2013

**PUBLISHED BY
THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY PRESS
PROJECT ADVISER: ROBERT L. DAUGHERTY
THE SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM
ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MD**

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to identify how the Obligation and Expenditure goals of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) affect programs within the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD). The hope is that a compilation of results will affect a change in the process so the Acquisition and Budget processes can be refined to better serve the end user and the Chemical Biological Defense (CBD) communities.

Research and survey data demonstrated that, not only are OSD Obligation and Expenditure goals relevant to program management, but Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA), regulation, release of funding, oversight, and internal processes are as well.

Respondents' comments were consistent regarding the perceived problems where the processes were concerned. Suggestions ranged from permitting program execution based upon milestones vs. a fiscal year calendar to goals being tailored to the acquisition strategy and program plan vs. OSD goals. There was support for giving the Joint Program Managers (JPMs) full funding autonomy while holding them accountable, expressing that program goals should be program specific and not universal.

Chapter 1—Introduction

Background

The Department of Defense (DoD) budget is determined by the Planning, Programming, Budget and Execution (PPBE) process and is initiated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB exists to aid the President with preparation of his budget and to ensure it is properly executed by the agencies. “OMB evaluates the effectiveness of agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among agencies, and sets funding priorities. ... In addition, OMB oversees and coordinates the Administrations’ procurement, financial management, and information and regulatory policies.” (OMB, 2012) Other agencies that have major roles in the budget processes are: the Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service (FMS); the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in the Legislative Branch; the Government Accountability Office (GAO), in the Legislative Branch. (OMB, 2012)

The Treasury makes federal payments, collects revenue, and is responsible for publishing the “Government-wide financial information that is used by the public and private sectors to monitor the Government’s financial status and establish fiscal and monetary policies.” (OMB, 2012) “CBO’s mission is to provide the Congress with the objective, timely, nonpartisan analyses needed for economic and budget decisions and with the information and estimates required for the congressional budget process.” (OMB, 2012) “GAO is the investigative arm of the Congress. GAO helps the Congress meet its Constitutional responsibilities and helps improve the performance and accountability of the Federal Government for the American people.” (OMB, 2012) The duties of all four of these offices overlap to help complete the budget process and provide accountability.

OMB circulates Circular No. A-11, *Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget* to all the heads of the Executive Departments. This circular provides guidance on preparing the

next fiscal year budget and provides direction regarding budget execution. The regulation that requires that the President submit a budget is The Budget and Accounting Act. (OMB, 2012)

There are three phases to the budget process: formulation, congressional, and execution.

Formulation

This process begins with OMB's sending of Circular No. A-11 in the spring of each year. This phase is ended approximately the first Monday in February when the President sends the budget to Congress.


Congressional

This process begins when Congress receives the budget from the President. Congress "considers the President's Budget proposals, passes overall revenue and spending plan called a 'budget resolution' and enact the regular appropriations acts and other laws that control spending and receipts." (OMB, 2012)

Execution


This process lasts 5 years and includes the apportionment and reporting and outlay processes. Apportionment "pertains to funds appropriated for that fiscal year and to balances of appropriations made in prior years that remain available for obligation." (OMB, 2012) OMB apportions funds, anticipated in the beginning of the fiscal year that may be obligated by the agencies. The reporting and outlay portion of the cycle continues until funds are canceled or completely disbursed.

An overview of the budget process is depicted below:



(OMB, 2012)

The major steps in the Congressional Phase of Budget enactment are depicted below:



(OMB, 2012)

Department of Defense Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)

The purpose of the CBDP is to “protect our nation and its allies from current and emerging threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” CBDP’s mission is “Provide Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) defense capabilities in support of the National Military Strategies.” The vision is “Ensure DoD Operations are unconstrained by CBRN effects.” (Department of Defense Chemical Biological Defense Program, 2010)

The CBDP represents one of the key constituents intended to address two of the three pillars of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD). CBDP exists to address “counterproliferation to combat weapons of mass destruction use” and “consequence management to respond to WMD use.” (Bolluyt, 2009) Research and development (R&D) efforts focus on “passive defense, consequence management, interdiction, and elimination operations. The CBDP supports strategic initiative to improve CBRN defense preparedness, to reduce risks to the warfighter, and to field the appropriate capabilities for sustained military operations with minimal degradation in combat effectiveness caused by CBRN hazards.” (Bolluyt, 2009)

Following September 11, 2001, it was recognized that the structure of the CBDP was fragmented and had too many bureaucratic layers. These problems affected the ability of the organization to act on “requirements generation, funding allocations, program execution, and funds management.” (Bolluyt, 2009) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) was requested to examine CBDP to determine whether Services and Combatant and Component Commanders were being appropriately represented in the programs. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) formed a task force to review the CBDP. As a

result of the findings, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the formation of the Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense (JRO-CBRND) within the J-8 and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD).

Funding at the JPEO level

What happens between the time Congress completes action of the appropriation bill and Program Management Offices (PMOs) receive their funding?

The JPEO-CBD executes the defense acquisition system for the CBDP. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD[NCB]) exercises oversight of the PPBE processes for the CBDP and allocates funding for the CBDP accounts, then the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) manages those funds. (Bolluyt, 2009)

DTRA also manages and integrates the science and technology portions of the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) portfolios, transitions the programs to the Joint Program Manager (JPM) level once it has matured.

Like the other Army Program Executive Offices (PEOs), the JPEO-CBD, Carmen Spencer, reports to Heidi Shyu, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology ASA(ALT). Unlike other PEOs, the CBDP funding stream is defense-wide funding as opposed to Army funding. As a result, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs Andrew Weber is the control point for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) strategy.

PMs prepare Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) budget plans during the third quarter of the present fiscal year for the next fiscal year. The purpose is to outline how much of which color money is needed for what, by when.

There are continuous budget drills where program managers (PMs) are to identify opportunities within their portfolios in which they can either give up or accept funding. These drills intensify in the third quarter since there is a large push to expend funding by the end of the fiscal year. If expenditure goals are not being met in one program, they may be taken and given to another. In the meantime, the program that gave up money likely will have its portfolio lessened the next year. There currently is no incentive for a program to acknowledge excess funding in one fiscal year. The ideal situation would be to give it up in the year it is not needed and get it back when it is needed. There are several reasons why programs may not spend in accordance with their spend plans and funding: late contract award, schedule slip, or extended design phase. Portfolios within the JPEO are often updated, but not beyond that level.

Problem Statement

PMOs are charged to execute their programs managing cost, schedule, performance, and risk. Having all these come together seamlessly is a large challenge. One of the measurement matrices is the OSD's obligation and expenditure goals. Also of importance is that the new fiscal year starts in October, though funding is not necessarily available at that time.

Purpose of Study

This paper seeks to understand the range of programs that are affected by the funding process and Obligation and Expenditure goals. The funding processes at the presidential, congressional, and PEO levels are reviewed to provide background information. The depth and breadth of the survey data will determine perceived efficiencies and possible areas for improvement.

Significance of Research

The results of this study may contribute to the overhaul of the current processes and the accountability system. Several areas could be addressed that would enable reaching Expenditure goals. The front end of the process—requirements and initial funding—could be addressed. As programs progress, evaluations of funding requirements could be performed and the portfolio updated to reflect the actual need without penalty. The cost estimation process of a program is out of the scope of this paper.

Overview of Research Methodology

Descriptive, normative, and impact questions were asked via survey to the JPEO-CBD for this paper. The initial questions identified the demographics of the survey participants. Further questions queried the types of funding, the effects that CRA and late funding have, effects of OSD Obligation and Expenditure goals, frequency of program progress reports, and use of trade space.

The research for this paper is largely qualitative in nature in that it seeks a holistic view of the topic as well as the understanding of the practices, requirements, and policies. The survey was sent to the entire JPEO-CBD to gather opinions of those involved in myriad programs. The desire is to positively impact the process through action research and feedback.

Limitations of Study

The limitation of this study is the limited number of responses. The survey itself is a systemic method of collecting data about how OSD Obligation and Expenditure goals affect programs. A limiting factor of a survey is the way the questions are standardized. This study did include open-ended questions that will reveal more in-depth information.

Action research is situational and may not reflect the opinions of the wider acquisition population. Also affecting the study is how the data may be used. With the current fiscal shortages,

many programs will be canceled or postponed, making lessons learned or organizational change a priority will be unlikely.

Validity of Research

The advantage of action research is that the participants in the study directly experience the issues being discussed and are largely upper-level employees with more than 11 years of Program Management experience. The process is orderly, practical, and relevant to an existing problem. The respondents are experts in their fields and often have experience in multiple programs. The hope is that the participants' experiences, observations, and comments will be used to improve the entire process and add information to the data already collected regarding program funding and execution.

Reliability of Responses

Since the majority of the participants expressed greater than 11 years of Program Management experience, their responses would be considered reliable. Sixty-two percent of the respondents were at the GS 13-15 levels, 37 percent were at the GS 12-13 levels. Disregarded were those responses that were flippant, that provided no value added, or that were not constructive. The tables represent a compilation of all responses while the free-form question responses have been summarized and, in some cases, truncated.

Chapter 2—Literature Review

Previous Survey

In July 2012, the JPEO launched a Lean Six Sigma Budget Execution Feedback survey. This survey was a part of a Black Belt project for a JPEO employee. The Continuous Process Improvement, Lean Six Sigma Office ran the project and followed the Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control (DMAIC) process. The DMAIC improvement cycle is the primary tool used to drive Six Sigma projects. All the steps are required and are followed in order. (PresentationEze)

The purpose of the survey was to ascertain what the JPMs and the JPEO perceived as the barriers to proper budget execution. The survey questions were process-related and queried job function, contracting, culture, cost estimates, planning, external requirements, metrics and oversight, tools, and processes. Respondents ranked subsets of the items listed above from 1 to 5 to describe what they viewed the problems. The response averages ranged from 2.7 (contract dollar ceiling) -4.1 CRA, and averaged right in the middle around 3. The midrange ranking suggests none of the issues given were particularly volatile. Responses to the questions: Open-ended questions invited comments regarding contributing factors and potential root causes associated with poor budget execution.

Respondents to the survey were: JPM Headquarters (HQ) Staff (20 percent), PM Staff (56 percent), and JPEO Headquarters Staff (26 percent). The job functions represented in the responses were Program Management (57 percent), Financial (12 percent), Engineering (11 percent), Science and Technology (6 percent), Administrative (6 percent), Logistics (5 percent), Test and Evaluation (3percent), and Contracting (2 percent). The numbers of responses ranged from 90 to 129 for the closed-ended questions (Headquarters, 2012)

Examples of the highest-rated (most problematic) areas are listed in Table 1:

| Area | Subset Item | Ranking |
|--------------------------------|---|---------|
| Contracting | Contract award lead time | 3.7 |
| Culture | Reprogramming/realignment of funds | 3.6 |
| | Headquarters (HQ) withholding of management funds | 3.6 |
| Cost Estimation | Cost estimation accuracy | 3.2 |
| Planning | Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) | 4.1 |
| | Optimistic Operational and Organizational (O&O) plans | 3.4 |
| | Scheduling | 3.4 |
| | Milestone and contract award | 3.4 |
| | Appropriation enactment timelines | 3.4 |
| External Requirements | Requirements creep | 3.3 |
| Metrics & Oversight | Oversight | 3.3 |
| Tools & Processes | Reporting lag | 3.3 |

Table 1. JPEO Lean Six Sigma Budget Execution Feedback

The numbers of responses ranged from 54 to 71 for the two open-ended questions. Most of the responses submitted to these questions were constructive. Those that were not are not included in the summary.

The questions and a summary of responses were:

1. Were there any contributing factors associated with Budget Execution that were not identified in this survey? If so, please submit a brief description of the problem and potential causative factors.
 - Micromanagement results in significant delays in program and contract execution. [JPM HQ]
 - Growing bureaucracy and more budget drills preventing attention to program execution. [PM]

- Funding is provided with little time to execute and the program office gets blamed/penalized for not executing in a timely manner. [PM]
- Delays due to external agencies. [PM]
- New requirements from HQ that are unclear. [PM]
- Data calls for information already provided. [PM]
- Unrealistic OSD goals and political process. (There were several comments on this topic.) OSD changed the goals midway through the fiscal year. [JPM HQ]
- Scheduling milestone reviews takes too long and external process takes too long. [PM]
- Get-well plans seem to be of little relevance. A valid get-well plan seems to carry little weight. [JPM HQ]
- Large lump sum payments for Food and Drug Administration (FDA) events cannot be divided up for execution. [PM]
- CRA delays. (There were several comments on this topic.) Full funding not received until 5 to 6 months into the year. [PM]
- Too much “staff work”—little to no value added. (There were several comments on this topic.) HQ taxes are a major source of late obligation/execution. [JPM HQ]
- Business management operations withholding funds based upon unrealistic expectations, micromanagement by JPEO business manager and staff. (There were several comments on this topic). [JPM HQ]
- Proper sizing of JPM staff, when programs end, people are still carried that should not be. [JPEO HQ]
- Timing of planned solicitations. (There were several comments on this topic.)[?]

- Overly aggressive/unrealistic acquisition schedules. Inability to take risk in terms of telling the story. [PM]
- DoD budget system. PMs are forced to plan a program based upon receipt of funding on Day One of the new fiscal year. However, funds are not usually received until the January-February timeframe at the earliest. [PM]
- Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight caused significant delays for my program. Even though the Operational Test Agencies (OTAs) were happy with the product, the DOT&E liaison continued to block my program and caused 6- to 12-month delays. [PM]
- Programs are sold to leadership with inadequate front-end analysis and overly optimistic schedules that are calendar driven (vice event driven). Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are grossly overestimated which results in schedule slip as technology matures at a less-than-planned pace. Forward funding worsens the O&O and funding execution mismatch. Nothing in schedules accounts for test failure. [JPEO HQ]
- Service contract awarded for calendar year and not fiscal year. [PM]
- Consideration outside the traditional Six Sigma toolbox for other tools for process improvement. The process is convoluted, and lean focus for reducing and eliminating process steps can add quality if people allowed the right mix of flexibility, authority, and accountability to achieve best outcomes. Requires a lot of external stakeholders to come together to streamline the process. [JPEO HQ]
- There is not an Official Budget Request Package established across JPEOCBD. [PM]

- Billing process and lag time from when contractor invoices and when the expenditure is reflected in the Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System (CCaRS). Too much lag time between invoice approved in Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) and Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) posting. Too much lag time in Standard Finance System (STANFINS). Too many DFAS errors. Expenditure rates are not supposed to be the measure for procurement funding. [PM]
 - Not enough bodies to do the work expected. [PM]
 - Proper budget training for PMs lacking. [JPM HQ]
2. Having gone through this survey, please list the top five contributors in order from greatest to least for failing to meet OSD execution goals. You may choose potential root causes identified in the survey or ones you identified in the previous question. (Headquarters, 2012)
- Contract award/modification (there were several comments on this topic); expenditure tracking lag; reporting systems alignment; CRA (there were several comments on this topic); requirements creep. [JPM HQ]
 - CRA; coordinated planning; prime contractor management of subcontractors; task completion; test failures. [PM]
 - Receiving funding late from PEO; goals not adjusted for when funds are received; reporting lag of expenditures (there were several comments on these topics). [PM]
 - Delay of current year funds availability; huge lag in reporting from DFAS after invoices are paid (there were several comments on this topic); lengthy procurement process (there were several comments on this topic)—even on completed Indefinite

- Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts; service organizations not interested in facilitating the execution of funds; not tailoring DoD 5000 requirements for lower Acquisition Category (ACAT) acquisition programs. [PM]
- HQ hold of funds (there were several comments on this topic). [PM]
 - Too much oversight in the funds release process. Lack of trust by higher HQ. [PM]
 - Coordinated planning, forward funding, cost estimation accuracy, scheduling, resolution plan. [JPEO HQ]
 - FDA approval timelines, overly optimistic O&O plans (there were several comments on this topic), contract award lead time, requirements creep, education of requirements, technology maturity. [JPEO HQ]
 - Delay in reports from stakeholders outside of purview (OTAs, Joint Requirements Office (JRO), services, contracting, etc.). PMs asking for too much money in a given year. Failure to manage to the schedule. Wrong color of money the wrong year. Test failures and unanticipated problems. [JPM HQ]
 - Poor planning before the fiscal year starts. Poor utilization of the flexibility to execute maximum amounts available during CRA. Acquisition program timelines/schedules are overly optimistic. System lag and discrepancies. [JPEO HQ]
 - Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process and the ripple effect on schedule and execution. [PM]
 - Contract restrictions/ceilings and delay in realignment authority. [PM]
 - Lack of logistics margin, never-ending acquisition reform, business practices of partners. [JPM HQ]

- Excessive risk aversion or “planning to fail” strategies. [JPEO HQ]
- Joint community is unable to agree on requirements that are testable, on time, and consistent. [PM]
- Unrealistic expectations: unknown amount of funds in the Total Obligation Authority (TOA) each year until release; O&O goals (doesn’t matter if we brief that we will be behind goal 20 percent in March and are correct—all that matters is meeting the goals); too many taskers, oversight, and JPEO meetings and reviews which interfere with execution of programs. [JPM HQ]
- Changing of O&O goals midyear. Being forced by the JPEO to agree to more aggressive schedules which aren’t realistic. [PM]
- CCaRS latency in reporting expenditures; JPEO staffing progress for Acquisition Plans (APs), etc. [PM]
- JPEO HQ micromanagement; DOT&E oversight; interpretation of acquisition reform. [JPM HQ]
- Bureaucracy; micromanagement; inherent risk. When you are developing state-of-the-art equipment, there is going to be risk that turns into issues. Time should be spent on managing the risk and not a bunch of numerous budget drills and should cost/would cost. [PM]
- Cultural and disincentive barriers to returning funds. [PM]
- Poor fund execution by government labs and Test and Evaluation (T&E) facilities. [PM]
- Funding is not in accordance with the program plan or acquisition strategy (e.g. FYDP asked for \$1 million in first year, \$3 million in second, \$5 million in third;

funding was zero for first year, \$3 million in second, \$6 million in third. Systems managers are not effective business managers. [PM]

- External compliance requirements. [JPM HQ]
- Multiyear contracts established prior to the onset of close funds execution monitoring. Contracts had a proper focus on deliverables, but did not have a payment schedule that supported the new expenditure guidelines. This is a good management process (we don't want to pay for something until it is complete and acceptable), yet is incompatible with this new "execute quickly" paradigm. Tax management. [JPM HQ]
- Uncertain and changing requirements for material release. [PM]
- Acquisition rules that can prevent spending of funds allotted to the project and limit the ability to shift funds. [PM]
- Manufacturing issues. [JPM HQ]
- HQ not taking the money away as soon as execution issues are known. [JPEO HQ]
- JPEO-CBD Financial Office exerting too much control and restriction of the JPM's funding. The more difficult JPEO-CBD Finance Office makes it for the JPMs to access their own program funds, the slower the obligation rates and the poorer the execution rates. A simple fix is to put the responsibility for Program Management back into the hands of the Chartered JPMs, who are experienced and certified in this area. Hold the PMs accountable for program execution and trust that these PMs will execute commander's intent. Perhaps a better linkage of new program starts and the outset of new FYs will aid in making the Obligation and Expenditure rates higher [PM]

- Excessive testing, excessive documentation. [PM]
- Last-second changes by signatory authority severely inhibit ability to execute program and budget. Oversight by Trail Boss and Medical Acquisition Inc., others inhibits ability to execute program. [PM]
- Non-value-added staff input. Taxation for support we don't see that reduces the funds available for the program (there were several comments on this topic). [PM]
- Contracting Officer (KO) demands and uncertainty regarding how fast a contract can be awarded. [PM]
- Schedule slips from original plan. Lack of command attention until execution is outside of OSD guidelines. Rigid adherence to published schedule in the out years despite known current year issues and impact on out-year schedule. [JPEO HQ]
- JPEO is not doing a good job of interpreting acquisition reform guidance. ACAT III programs should not have been subjected to such dramatic change. Give power back to the PMs. [PM]
- Schedule slips due to technical challenges, test facility availability, inaccurate schedule projection. Unwillingness to reset product POM estimates to eliminate forward funding. [JPEO HQ]
- Hire experienced project managers and system integrators. Adhere to a disciplined project management process. Use independent verification and validation of system implementation. Periodic re-evaluation of system implementation, including whether to half implementation or move forward on a different path. Use of executive oversight bodies for the project that have sufficient and appropriate authority to remove impediments to project implementation and also support

continuation or project cancellation. Explain variance, focus on second- and third-order effects, be transparent with information. [JPEO HQ]

- Large amounts of funds sent to Other Government Agencies (OGAs) we do not control. [PM]
- Lack of proper communication in chain of command, coordination, and staffing between Army Budget Office (ABO)/Department of the Army Systems Coordinator (DASC)/KO/JPEO/JPM/PM. Lack of knowledge/understanding on JPEO staff on the types of procurement actions being processed by the PMs and that all procurements are “off the shelf widgets” or can be assessed in a “one size fits all briefing chart” analysis. JPEO needs to focus its resources on the priorities (real drivers) regarding execution issues and stop using stoplight color coding as a substitute for in-depth acquisition and financial analysis, focusing on the significant programs with major funding. Recommend JPEO track programs with longer lead times under a separate metric system and realize that all procurements are not the same and allow exceptions to “rule of thumb” OSD goals when circumstances warrant. [JPM HQ]
- Failure to allocate funds to contractors’ companies in a timely fashion. These companies cannot report expenditures of funds they have not yet received. Some funding allocations are months behind. [PM]
- Intentional forward funding of a program. [PM]

Results of the JPEO Survey

This survey caused several processes within the JPEO-CBD to change:

1. The JPEO HQ no longer withholds management funds.

2. A funding request system was enacted to track funding requests from the JPM to HQ.
(This fills a gap not addressed by the new financial system, General Fund Enterprise Business Systems [GFEBs].)
3. Increased validation or scrutiny of O&O Plans between the PM and HQ.
4. Updating Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) to define specific processes that have been unclear and/or undefined in the past (e.g., how to handle CRA funding requests).

More changes are being considered by the JPEO HQ. Each change must be reviewed and approved before put into place.

Chapter 3—Research Methodology

The purpose of this study was to ascertain the kinds of problems programs have been experiencing due to OSD Obligation and Expenditure goals as well as the effects of the overall budget process. Responses should give feedback, that when coupled with the Lean Six Sigma survey, should give good indications where the process needs adjustment.

Research Questions

The survey questions were formulated to ascertain whether JPMs had problems reaching and maintaining OSD Obligation and Expenditure goals as well as the effect of the ramifications. How can the processes within PEOs be better structured to be more effective? How can the processes out of the PM's and PEO's control be streamlined so goals can be better met? In most cases, it seems many of the issues encountered are beyond the PM and JPEO level. How will concerns above this level be addressed? Will concerns be taken seriously above the PM and JPEO level since CBD is such a small part of the overall Army picture?

Research Process

This study utilized a descriptive applied research process that resulted in qualitative and quantitative responses to survey questions. The target audience was the JPEO-CBD acquisition workforce that was involved in the program management process. Most of the respondents had more than 20 years of government service. Most of the respondents had 1 to 5 years acquisition experience, with 11 to 15 years and greater than 20 years following closely.

Data Collection

Data Collection will be accomplished by literature search and a qualitative survey through SurveyMonkey.

Chapter 4—Findings

The objective of this research is to determine the level of issues perceived by the JPMs regarding their programs and obligation and expenditure goals.

Population and Sample Size

The survey was sent to the approximately 1,000 employees of the JPEO-CBD. The JPEO “is the Joint Services single focal point for research, development, acquisition, fielding, and life-cycle support of chemical and biological defense equipment and medical countermeasures.” (Defense, 2012)

Nine areas fall under JPEO-CBD: Joint Project Manager Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Contamination Avoidance (JPM-NBC-CA); Joint Project Manager Biological Defense (JPM-BD); Joint Project Manager, Guardian (JPM-Guardian); Chemical Biological Medical Systems (CBMS); Joint Project Manager-Protection (JPM-P); Medical Countermeasures Advanced Development and Manufacturing (Medical Countermeasures ADM); Joint Project Manager-Information Systems (JPM-IS); Joint Project Manager-Transformational Medical Technologies (JPM-TMT) and. Recently, the Joint Product Management Office-Biosurveillance. Each of these JPMs is responsible for a myriad of programs.

Respondent Demographics

Most respondents had more than 20 years in the military, government, or contractor arenas (53 percent). Eighteen percent had 6 to 10 years, while no one had less than 1 year. On the Program Management side, it was interesting to note a different trend: The largest number of the survey participants (26 percent) had 1 to 5 years experience. Twenty-four percent had 11 to 15 years, while 18 percent had more than 20 years. Sixty-two percent of these people were GS 13-15 level employees, with 37 percent being GS 12-13 and 1 percent being GS 5-8 (Interns). The

primary acquisition fields most represented were program management (47 percent) and systems engineering (24 percent). Most poorly represented were test and evaluation (4 percent) and contracting (2 percent).

The groups that had the highest survey participation were: JPM-P (35 percent), JPM-NBC-CA (25 percent), and JPM-Guardian ((18 percent). It was interesting to note that 49 percent of those who participated in the survey chose not to answer this question. Most skipped question totals were in the low- to mid-single digits. This demonstrates lack of trust that the survey is anonymous.

Survey Results

Survey results demonstrate that the majority of the programs are funded by Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds (83 percent), followed by procurement (71 percent), and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) (39 percent). These numbers total almost 200 percent, and the responses total 169 for 82 people. This probably is because many programs utilize more than one type of funds. An overwhelming majority (92 percent) communicated that receiving funds beyond October affected their programs.

Late funding affects programs (in rank of most to least) by: delayed schedule (94 percent), increased cost (56 percent), and decreased capability (53 percent), with money spent to keep the contractor alive having little value (23 percent). Those polled who added additional impacts expressed:

- Delayed RDT&E contracting efforts.
- Program delay and increased costs.
- Delay in program resulting in low expenditures, delay in program, and decreased capability for the warfighter.

- Delayed expenditures, potential delay in contract options and awards, stop work.
- Delayed program start.
- Projects delayed indefinitely.
- Part of the program was cut.
- Requirements moved to future fiscal years (FYs).
- Insufficient PM activities with waterfall effects on all projects.
- Reduced burn rate of prime developer, reduced production of capability that is targeted for Operational Test later in the fiscal year. Integration opportunities with the targeted recipients could be greatly impacted.
- Need more people to handle all of the extra work and lack of attention to performance issues.
- Unable to ship necessary items or purchase materials and supplies.
- Lost program funding.
- Program requested realignment of other JPM funds, leading to issues for other JPM programs. It's a cyclic situation.
- If procurement funding is not released in the amount requested for a minimum buy, it causes price increases for those units that we have purchased.
- Obligation and execution do not meet OSD goals.
- Decreased production, limited R&D.

Most of the PMs (61 percent) plan their budget and schedule to provide carry over funding for contractors and OGAs. Carryover funding most often is planned for 3 months (50 percent) with some planned for 6 months (13 percent). Respondents offer that carryover funding does not affect Obligation/Expenditure goals (40 percent). However, an equal sampling state that carry over

funding caused their Obligation/Expenditure goals to be yellow, while approximately half (19 percent) expressed that their goals turned red. Programs are considered green if within 2 percent of goal; yellow if within 2 to 5 percent of goal, and red if greater than 5 percent of meeting the goals.

Those who provided further explanation stated that:

- Carryover typically makes current year goals unachievable until past year dollars are spent. Carryover is often needed to bridge the gap before current dollars are available.
- If I got behind, I authorized the contractor to deliver early until I brought them back into line with DoD goals. I tried to keep my contractor on a calendar year execution, because I expected Congress would be late. Note that Congress changed the fiscal year a long time ago, because it could not deliver the budget in time. Now it has 3 \more months and still is 3 months late.
- For contractors on RDT&E (i.e., 2-year money), and assuming a contract is in place and the funding is on the contract, it works well. For government salaries (on reimbursable funds), it can get awkward. For Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) funding, it doesn't work—it's 1-year funding.
- In some cases, it does cause the previous year to be slightly behind on Obligations and Expenditures. However, during CRA, when we've obligated all our CRA and we get midyear remainders late (May and sometimes as late as June-July) that causes more problems than anyone should encounter.
- Carryover funding is normally only attributed to Other Government Entities (OGEs), not contractors. Being that we never are certain when we will release our first increment of CRA funding (can be as late as the second quarter because we do

not receive O&M (Operation and Maintenance funds), we do send extra for our government civilian salaries for 1 to 2 months—not always 3 months.

- Contracting activities occur all year. Funds not used immediately upon arrival are taken away because they are not instantly obligated. Poorest planning approach I have ever seen.
- Three-month carryover doesn't affect expenditure rates, but late release of money has significant effect, as does prolonged CRA.

When polled about whether CRA disbursements have met program needs, the overwhelming majority (68 percent) responded that they did not.

The majority of those polled (81 percent) said they met obligation goals in the first year of disbursement. Those that didn't expressed that the impacts to programs were:

- Impacts to cost, schedule, and performance.
- Quarterly justification request and closer monitoring.
- Reduction in funding for future years.
- For RDT&E money, can carry it forward and put it toward future requirements.
- PM chaos.
- Traditionally, we do meet goals. If we don't, it is usually due to late provision of funds the previous year or during the CRA.
- May not complete goals.
- Delayed RDT&E contracting efforts.
- Goals are normally met unless there are fourth-quarter milestones.
- Effects vary, depending on the contract.

- Not meeting obligation goal in the first year of disbursement is not common for our PMO. One instance where it may occur is if a program schedule slips to the right and the funds are not required. However, in this situation we would either realign the funds to cover an internal Unfunded Request (UFR) of a program that requires them or return them back to HQ for a potential swap of funds in the next FY.
- Multiyear money should be multiyear money. Meet goals usually in the first quarter of next year. Added cost and schedule disruption.
- IT DEPENDS.
- A lot of time spent answering questions about why goals are not met, but didn't have the money to meet goals.

Sixty-six percent of those that provided input stated that they regularly met expenditure goals for their programs. The 33 percent that did not meet goals said the ramifications were: reduced funding the next year (35 percent), increased reporting (28 percent), funding taken (25 percent), and no effect (12 percent). Those who gave free-form answers expressed the following:

- Expenditures are based on contract awards and types. Installations take longer than 9 to 18 months depending upon the size of the installation and late receipt of funding compounds the issues.
- Expenditures should not be the tracking matrix based on current DAU guidance, so we are tracking an artificial goal and wasting a great deal of time. We see PowerPoint analysis instead of event driven execution.
- This year, we have received less funding which greatly impacts the long-term schedule and capabilities of the program. It doesn't appear that mid- to long-term impacts ever are taken into consideration when funding is reduced.

- Due to delays in the prime contract award, the majority of our FY12 funding was not obligated or expensed. Thus, our FY14 funding was reduced and FY15/16 funding increased. This shift in funding has delayed the program 1 year.
- All three options have occurred, smallest deviation to extreme being: increased reporting, funding taken, funding reduced next year.
- Funding taken, funding reduced next year, and increased reporting.
- We waste a lot of time on activities addressing funding matters that do not provide benefit to developing equipment for the warfighter.
- Out-years are negatively affected.
- Increases reporting with negative implications for the program. This consumes Program Management time that could be spent working technical issues. This decreases capability for the warfighter.
- Budget reviews are a complete waste of time. If you want to improve expenditures, release funding sooner, not later.
- Last minute scramble to get “green” before funding is taken. Increased oversight during this time even though root cause is outside program control.

Most of the program progress is reported by briefings to upper management (75 percent) as opposed to the Acquisition Status Report (ASR) (56 percent). Program offices reported having to defend their budgets monthly (50 percent), quarterly (31 percent), annually (18 percent), semi-annually (15 percent) and bimonthly (8 percent). Free-form comments regarding frequency of defending program budget were:

- Sporadically throughout the year.

- Budget amounts are not normally touched unless there is a serious issue with the spend plan.
- Annually in theory, continuously in practice.
- Formally, during midyear review and POM build, but it seems like we are doing it very frequently given the new fiscal environment.
- Almost every other week.
- Feels like daily.
- Daily.
- Over the last 3 years, defending programs has increased. Sometimes more than monthly.

When asked how they defended their budgets, the responses were briefings to the JPEO/staff and briefings to the PM. Free-form comments were:

- PEO Staff, Army G8, ASA(ALT), ABO.
- DASC, ASA(ALT), G3/5/7, G8, ABO.
- Department of the Army (DA) through a Weapon Systems Review.
- Communication with financial staff.
- Responding to internal taskers.
- Depends on the level of the program. Normally deal with “the Building”— ASA(ALT), G8, and G3/5/7. (We are a PEO, not a JPEO.)
- Between Joint Lifecycle Management Review (JLCMR) and PM reviews.
- Joint Service Chemical Biological Information System (JSCBIS) explanations.
- No one.
- PM defends to the Business Manager.

- Briefings and white papers to the Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE) Office.
- The U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM).
- Briefings to stakeholders.

Adjustments to program budgets due to execution issues did occur. In most cases, the budget was decreased (59 percent). Alternately, the profile was readjusted (55 percent) or the budget was increased (10 percent). Individual comments expressed were:

- Hard to plan long-term for programs of record when base funding is consistently reduced against a valid requirement.
- Each budget review has resulted in different results based upon the ability to execute the funding, time, and the changing PM Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle priorities.
- If my programs exceeded obligation and disbursement goals, I had a better chance of getting more funding.
- Depends on program and program priority. Typically, adjustments are made within a portfolio or commodity area, so all three activities occur.
- We have had slips in overall funding with minimal funding provided in the interim along with reductions and the notice of possibly more reductions. Funding is constantly being reduced (or at least the potential is there) with no reduction of testing or capability requirements.
- POM quantities maintained.
- Initial Operational Capability/Full Operational Capability (IOC/FOC) dates moved to the right.

- We are spending surplus funds in other areas where permitted.
- No impact. Program was a Joint Urgent Operations Needs Statement (JUONS).

Most respondents felt that the time gap between invoices and the posting of payments negatively affected their program (64 percent). Concerns were raised regarding the slow pace of multiple organizations involved that had competing priorities. Other comments were:

- Oftentimes funds are spent on contract by the prime or subs with a multiple-month lag time before they hit the official books. This affects expenditure plans and requests for additional funds when the contract is out of funds.
- MRAP project timelines have always been very aggressive. Being able to utilize Earned Value Management (EVM) was extremely difficult due to the time gap vs. over schedules.
- In production—no. DFAS is very good about paying within 30 days, if Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) inputs the contract correctly. Note this assumes that no progress payments are issued—that complicates the payments and typically delays the final payment.
- In cost plus situations—yes. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is almost always behind completing their incurred cost audits. By the regulation, DCMA can only authorize payment of up to 85 percent of the fee. Thus you get into situations where money is expiring—and I mean expiring—yet the entire payment is still incomplete. This causes confusion in the payments by DFAS, excessive additional costs by contractual controllers and their auditors, additional oversight costs to DCMA, and additional costs to resource managers, who are trying to use any funds

that are not going to be used. There is a huge cost in this—one that no one wants to quantify.

- Yes—especially when Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requesting (MIPRing) money to different agencies (Department of Energy, Navy, etc.). The time lag between spending and reporting significantly hits disbursement rate reporting with the comptroller and causes significant extra reporting requirements.
- Invoice period of subs, compounded with invoice period of prime, compounded with DFAS lag in reporting, (compounded with late funding) frequently results in first disbursements happening in late 2Q [second quarter]. If I had to award a new task order as a contract vehicle for support efforts, add a few more weeks to the slip.
- Must manage in an ineffective manner due to unknown funding profile.
- The lag between invoicing and payment from DFAS has a huge impact as the 60- to 90-day lag is not taken into consideration at the higher levels. It can make a tremendous difference to expenditure rates, and has frequently made the difference between GREEN and AMBER/RED.
- Increased management effort to continually monitor/urge invoicing activities to post funding status.
- Despite work being completed, the lack of payments reflecting in the system causes expenditure goals to lag behind when it comes to reporting. The usually leads to additional explanation and questioning from higher up.
- Invoicing from prime may begin within 45 to 60 days after contract award.
Invoicing of major subcontractors to primes does not occur until about 75 to 90

days after award. If contract awarded by another Service contract, time lag of additional month between Service and DFAS.

- Lag of expenditures by a month at least, more if there are payment issues.
- Some OGEs only submit billing to DFAS once a month. This can cause a 30- to 45-day lag time in seeing expenditures once a funding document has been charged. For Contracts, there is usually a 60-day lag due to the following process: contractor billing (30 days), Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) invoices or Receiving Report (RR) acceptance by Contracting Officer Representative (COR) or DCMA (30 days), then posting by DFAS.
- Threats to pull our money because the system shows low expenditure rates, although we have invoices showing different numbers. Because our expenditure rate appears low, end up getting less money.
- Often invoices can be submitted and approved months before the payments are posted. This results in repeated briefings to the JPEO and PMs on something that largely has been completed and/or expended. Also, there is constant pressure to use government laboratories, which invoice and disburse funds on a first-in, first-out basis. Although the work has been completed, the disbursements are often more than 6 months after actual completion of the work.
- As a PM, we are discouraged from using payment plans to incentivize our contractors or support labs to invoice on time because then our obligations are not 100 percent. Therefore the Obligation and Expenditure goals negatively affect our ability as PMs to manage our programs consistent with industry best practices.

- OSD goals do not adequately or realistically reflect this gap making. When combined with late arrival of funding, expenditures are always behind early in the year leading to more time spent defending the funding profile rather than on the program work.
- Increased scrutiny and no understanding by all levels of bureaucracy.

Survey respondents respond that due to funding changes that Key Systems Attributes (KSAs) are reduced (90 percent) more than Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) (29 percent). Other comments made include:

- Neither has happened.
- Most systems are post Milestone C, so new features/enhancements, reduced quantities of Systems, Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA), or Government Subject Matter Expert (SME) support. (BCT LLC, 2012)
- None of KPPs or KSAs reduced. But other requirements were postponed or cut to adjust for budget cut.
- One strategy we have attempted to employ is delivering the most important capability to the end user first and then additional capabilities as they can be developed and tested. This has met with some resistance in the OT community.
- Requirements not reduced, but trade space emphasized and quantities reviewed.
- Operation and Maintenance (O&M) for sustainment. Reduction in funding impact the number of systems available for the mission.
- User almost never reduces requirements. Decreases in funding always result in program slips.

- Not reduced, but we must come up with less than optimal ways to prove the requirements.
- IOC and FOC quantities have a huge impact in medical development. The FOC quantities drive what scale of manufacturing needs to be developed to meet the demand. Often, as is the case with therapeutics and vaccines, the FOC quantities are extremely high compared to the actual need. The actual need is not conveyed until after the scale-up has occurred, usually MS C or in the development of the Capability Production Document (CPD) for Milestone C. For vaccines, this is determined by the vaccination policy, which isn't provided until after FDA approval (post-MS C). Therefore, significant development costs to scale-up could be avoided with earlier procurement quantity analysis.

In most cases, when the program office found it necessary to reduce requirements, the end user viewed the practice as trade space (78 percent). However, there were cases when the end user no longer wanted the item (30 percent). If there was more than one end user, program efficiencies may have been realized as in the case of the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). In this case, the Marine Corps pulled out of the program and the PM substituted a less costly commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) hardened computer. Other comments by the survey participants were:

- We cannot support as many system upgrades to fielded units.
- Training Primary Containment Module (PCM) part of trade effort.
- Possible delay in fielding by 2 years.
- Some installations didn't want our product at all. Our program was forced upon them. It was a waste of taxpayer dollars.

- Reduction in unit quantities produced equate to reduction in fielded units and the users not being able to meet their overall quantity goals (Total Service Requirement and/or Army Acquisition Objective).
- Neither.
- Requirements almost never reduced.
- Stakeholders upset with delay in testing and ultimate concern with impact to fielding.

When those in the program office were asked how the PEO, Deputy Under Secretary of the Army Test and Evaluation (DUSA-TE), OSD viewed the reduced requirements and/or program delay, most of the respondents were unsure (44 percent). Other responses were: a necessary compromise (43 percent), a reason to cancel the program (21 percent), and as trade space (16 percent). Free-form comments were:

- They viewed reduced requirements negatively if they even knew what the requirements were to begin with. As long as expenditures met goals, program delays had little impact on how these organizations viewed the project.
- The MRAP Vehicle requirements went through a long scrubbing process and ended up with the existing fielded vehicles being "good enough." Also known as the MRAP Performance Baseline. Upgrading each vehicle to meet additional requested capabilities was determined to be too costly.
- At the OSD level, they don't seem to understand that reduced sets of capability equates to less testing. They still feel they need to test everything vice what is there. Instead of approaching OT in a smaller, more focused method, they insist on

conducting full-blown, end-to-end testing, requiring resources for much larger sets of capabilities in environments over which the system ultimately has little control.

- Were able to minimize impact to KSAs and KPPs. No impact.
- JPEO lined out joint funding and relied on Army to continue funding. Army didn't appreciate the reduction in total units produced.
- Due to a delay in program funding disbursement the program was canceled.
- PEO never helps the situation. Only requires additional briefings that negatively impact time available to do productive work.

The last two questions of the survey were open-ended to obtain responses that were not directed in any manner. When asked how programs should be held accountable for their funding, the following comments were received:

- This is a tough question when the appropriators cannot pass bills allowing the execution of acquisition strategies. Given that, how can programs be held accountable for their funding? We make the system work, but are not efficient stewards of funding in managing programs.
- Review usefulness of expenditure requirements and expected return on investment.
- Allow the ability to execute based on milestones and not fiscal year calendar.
- There should be a mechanism to logically adjust program funding without penalty—specifically for situations outside of PM control (delay in contract award).
- PMs should develop sound obligation and expense plans that meet goals, but be able to change the plan when unforeseen circumstances warrant. PMs should be accountable and able to explain funding status.

- Locally generated expenditure plans should be updated quarterly. OSD goals should be in effect to track potential issues but not used for arbitrary funding changes if the program has a plan for existing funding.
- The capability needs of the warfighters must be prioritized in order to determine which programs receive funding.
- Programs should be held accountable by status reporting.
- Funding for execution beyond a year should be deobligated.
- Spend plans should be reviewed regularly.
- More risk needs to be taken to accelerate technology innovation.
- If Congress and higher HQ delay funds release, then the programs should be granted the same time adjustment to schedules and funding goals. (There were many comments expressing this view).
- By matrix against realistic planning and reality.
- Obligations and Expenditures should be viewed in balance with program strategy and overall progress.
- Goals should be tailored to the acquisition strategy and not a preset accounting drill.
- Give the JPMs full funding and autonomy and hold them accountable.
- Obligation and expenditure goals are good indicators, but case-by-case analysis is needed, especially with R&D programs. When developing state-of-the-art equipment that must be integrated with other equipment and work in a variety of harsh environments, there are going to be challenges.
- Programs should be held accountable, but the obligation/expenditure exercises are unnecessary. We push to obligate more than push to save. There appears to be a

negative backlash for saving that does not coincide with the Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives.

- How can we be months into the fiscal year without any confidence in the current year budget for the program?
- The culture encourages a constant protection of funds whether they are needed or now. More funding would be offered up if it could be obtained later.
- Forward funding must be reduced to gain credibility/defend ability in POM meetings.
- Tie goals to contract awards.
- There needs to be some realization from higher management that all program goals cannot be met according to schedule when the program budget is on a constant state of flex. There needs to be some level of reasonableness.
- Accountability should be based on the quality of work, not how fast funds are spent.
- Build a plan, track to the plan—not OSD goals.
- A program should be held accountable at a holistic level. If there are issues with funding, there is an indication there may be other issues within the program.
- There should be dialogue regarding reasons for not meeting expenditures.
- There should not be OSD goals. Program should present a spending plan and be held to the plan. Each program can have unique funding profiles based upon their place in the acquisition life cycle. There needs to be the ability to adjust the spend plan as risk events occur.
- If programs are not able to obligate and expend their funds, the funds should be pulled and utilized for another purpose.

- There needs to be a more realistic approach than OSD goals.
- Offer tax breaks for those who meet OSD goals.
- Use a universal accounting system with close to real-time adjustments so that everyone is on the same page.

The final survey question asked the respondents to share any comments they had regarding their program and OSD goals. A compilation and summary of the responses received are detailed in the following bullets:


- OSD goals are excellent if money arrives on time and in amount required. Delays, cuts, and changes impact the programs and therefore the ability to meet those goals. Changes in funding profiles also cause PMs to game the system to reduce risk.
- They [OSD goals] are irrelevant. Should be held accountable by exception rather than all programs.
- If there is an agreed-upon deviation from tracking goals, that should become the new metric vice defending the same justification month after month.
- OSD goals are not effective for R&D projects that span multiple years and require more than labor support.
- OSD goals are a good yardstick. The only reason they exist is because someone abused the system in the past.
- Timing of the reprogramming actions (May) vs. average receipt of funds (mid- to late-second quarter) is a significant issue.
- Need to sunset programs earlier and have smaller, new-start programs that innovate, vs. perpetuate old technology.

- There appears to be little to no higher HQ taking into account the delay in congressional funding/DoD/Army release of funds when requiring programs to hold to schedules predicated on timely release of funds.
- OSD goals are sound, but if you apply July goals against the entire TOA when the entire TOA isn't received until May, there will be issues in reporting status.
- OSD goals are unrealistic and counterproductive to good program management.
- It is what it is. As PMs, we have to deal with CRA yearly now so we just readjust the best we can, given the fiscal climate. Hopefully, things will get better in a few years.
- In my program, it is fairly easy to make OSD goals due to program set up with delivery type of contracts. CRA is what makes execution cost efficiency an issue.
- First-quarter goals are completely unrealistic given that programs don't have funds on-hand to execute until December. Every year starts out playing catch-up.
- Goals are goals; management should not add unrealistic goals over and above OSD goals.
- Should costs targets complicate meeting OSD goals.
- Goals should be program specific (not universal).

Now that OSD goals account for CRA delays, that has made it a little easier in the first two quarters of the FY to meet OSD goals. One negative about OSD goals is that depending on a program's schedule, if there are third- to fourth-quarter events/MS awards, the chances of meeting OSD goals for midyear review (MYR) or other funding drills are slim to none until late in the FY. Sometimes this can lead to funding decrements and/or reductions in the following years. This can

be unexpected and difficult for program managers to sustain, especially when they are on track with the schedule that was briefed and published in their budget forms.


Research Questions and Collected Data



| 1. How many years of experience do you have in the military, federal government, or contractor areas? | | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| <1 | 0.0% | 0 |
| 1-5 | 7.1% | 6 |
| 6-10 | 17.6% | 15 |
| 11-15 | 10.6% | 9 |
| 16-20 | 11.8% | 10 |
| >20 | 52.9% | 45 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 85 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 0 |

Table 2. Years of Experience in Federal Areas


2. How many years of experience do you have in the Program Management area?



| 2. How many years of experience do you have in the Program Management area? | | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| <1 | 7.1% | 6 |
| 1-5 | 26.2% | 22 |
| 6-10 | 16.7% | 14 |
| 11-15 | 23.8% | 20 |
| 16-20 | 8.3% | 7 |
| >20 | 17.9% | 15 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 84 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 1 |

Table 3. Years of Experience in the PM Area

3. What is your current pay grade or equivalent GS level?




3. What is your current pay grade or equivalent GS level?

| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
|--------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| GS 5-8 | 1.3% | 1 |
| GS 9-11 | 0.0% | 0 |
| GS 12-13 | 36.7% | 29 |
| GS 13-15 | 62.0% | 49 |
| SES | 0.0% | 0 |
| Other (please specify) | | 8 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 79 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 6 |

Other: 3 contractors, 2 LTCs, 1 retired military/contractor, 1 NHIV

Table 4. Equivalent GS Level


4. What is your primary acquisition career field?



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
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Systems Engineering | 23.5% | 19 |
| Life-Cycle Logistics | 7.4% | 6 |
| Contracting | 2.5% | 2 |
| Business, Cost Estimating, and Financial Management | 16.0% | 13 |
| Test and Evaluation | 3.7% | 3 |
| Program Management | 46.9% | 38 |
| Other (please specify) | | 5 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 81 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 4 |

Table 5. Primary Acquisition Career Field



| 5. For which Program Management (PM) or Product Director (PD) office do you work? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Joint Product Manager Nuclear Biological Chemical Contamination Avoidance (JPM-NBC-CA) | 24.6% | 14 |
| Chemical Biological Medical Systems (CBMS) | 15.8% | 9 |
| Joint Product Manager Protection (JPM-P) | 35.1% | 20 |
| Medical Countermeasures | 1.8% | 1 |
| Joint Product Manager Information Systems (JPM-IS) | 1.8% | 1 |
| Joint Product Manager Guardian | 17.5% | 10 |
| Joint Product Manager Transformational Medical Technologies (JPM-TMT) | 3.5% | 2 |
| Other (please specify) | | 26 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 57 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 28 |


Table 6. PM Area



| 6. What type(s) of funding does your program use? | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| RDT&E | 82.9% | 68 |
| PROC | 70.7% | 58 |
| O&M | 39.0% | 32 |
| Other (please specify) | | 5 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 82 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 3 |


Table 7. Color of Money

7. Does delay of funding receipt beyond October affect your program?



| 7. Does delay of funding receipt beyond October affect your program? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 91.8% | 78 |
| No | 8.2% | 7 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 85 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 0 |


Table 8. Delay of Funding



| 8. How does late funding affect your program? | | |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Decreased capability | 53.2% | 42 |
| Increased cost | 55.7% | 44 |
| Delayed schedule | 93.7% | 74 |
| Money spent to keep the contractor alive has little value | 22.8% | 18 |
| Other (please specify) | | 22 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 79 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 6 |

Table 9. Late Funding


9. Do you plan for contractors and Other Government Agencies (OGAs) to have carryover funding?



| 9. Do you plan for contractors and Other Government Agencies (OGAs) to have carryover funding? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 60.7% | 51 |
| No | 39.3% | 33 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 84 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 1 |

Table 10. Carryover Funding


10. If you provide for carryover funding, for how long?



| 10. If you provide for carryover funding, for how long? | | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| 3 months | 50.0% | 39 |
| 6 months | 12.8% | 10 |
| 9 months | 0.0% | 0 |
| N/A | 37.2% | 29 |
| Other (please specify) | | 6 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 78 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 7 |

Table 11. Length of Carryover Funding


11. How has carryover funding affected Obligation/Expenditure goals?



| 11. How has carryover funding affected Obligation/Expenditure goals? | | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| No change | 40.5% | 30 |
| Caused them to be yellow | 40.5% | 30 |
| Caused them to be red | 18.9% | 14 |
| Other (please specify) | | 11 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 74 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 11 |

Table 12. Carryover Funding and Obligation/Expenditure Goals


12. Have Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) disbursements met your program needs?



| 12. Have Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) disbursements met your program needs? | | |
|--|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 32.1% | 27 |
| No | 67.9% | 57 |
| Why or why not? | | 52 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 84 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 1 |

Table 13. Continuing Resolution Authority

13. Does your program meet obligation goals in the first year of disbursement?




| 13. Does your program meet obligation goals in the first year of disbursement? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 80.7% | 67 |
| No | 19.3% | 16 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 83 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 2 |

Table 14. Obligation Goals in First Year of Disbursement

14. If you did not meet obligation goals in the first year of disbursement, when do you and how does it affect your program? (No graphics or tables)


15. Do you regularly meet funding expenditure goals?



| 15. Do you regularly meet funding expenditure goals? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 66.3% | 55 |
| No | 33.7% | 28 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 83 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 2 |

Table 15. Expenditure Goals

16. If you do not meet funding expenditure goals, how does it affect your program?




16. If you do not meet funding expenditure goals, how does it affect your program?

| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| Funding taken | 25.0% | 17 |
| Funding reduced next year | 35.3% | 24 |
| Increased reporting | 27.9% | 19 |
| No affect | 11.8% | 8 |
| Other (please specify) | | 18 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 68 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 17 |


Table 16. Effects of Not Meeting Expenditure Goals

17. How often do you have to report program progress (cost, schedule, performance, risk)?




| 17. How often do you have to report program progress (cost, schedule, performance, risk)? | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Monthly | 74.3% | 55 |
| Quarterly | 24.3% | 18 |
| Yearly | 1.4% | 1 |
| Other (please specify) | | 11 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 74 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 11 |

Table 17. Frequency of Program Reporting




| 18. What format does program progress reporting take? | | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| ASR | 56.2% | 41 |
| Briefing | 75.3% | 55 |
| Other (please specify) | | 13 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 73 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 12 |

Table 18. Program Reporting Mechanism




| 19. How often do you have to defend your program budget? | | |
|---|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Monthly | 50.0% | 36 |
| Bimonthly | 8.3% | 6 |
| Quarterly | 30.6% | 22 |
| Semiannually | 15.3% | 11 |
| Annually | 18.1% | 13 |
| Other (please specify) | | 17 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 72 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 13 |

Table 19. Frequency of Defending Budget



| 20. How do you defend your program budget? | | |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Briefings to JPEO/staff | 68.4% | 52 |
| Briefings to PM | 72.4% | 55 |
| Other (please specify) | | 17 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 76 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 9 |


Table 20. Method of Defending Program Budget



| 21. What kind of adjustments have been made to your program budget? | | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Decreased overall | 59.2% | 45 |
| Profile readjusted | 55.3% | 42 |
| Increased overall | 10.5% | 8 |
| Other (please specify) | | 14 |
| <i>answered question</i> | | 76 |
| <i>skipped question</i> | | 9 |


Table 21. Adjustments to Program Budget

22. Does the time gap between invoicing and payments being posted negatively affect your program?




| 22. Does the time gap between invoicing and payments being posted negatively affect your program? | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Yes | 64.3% | 54 |
| No | 35.7% | 30 |
| How? | | 43 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 84 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 1 |

Table 22. Time Gap Between Invoicing and Payments Posted




| 23. If program requirements were reduced, which ones? | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| KPPs | 28.9% | 11 |
| KSAs | 89.5% | 34 |
| Other (please specify) | | 18 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 38 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 47 |

Table 23. Reduced Program Requirements



| 24. How did the end user view the reduced requirements? | | |
|---|--------------------------|----------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| Trade space | 78.3% | 36 |
| No longer wanted the item | 30.4% | 14 |
| Other (please specify) | | 16 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 46 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 39 |

Table 24. End User’s View of Reduced Requirements



| 25. How did the PEO/DUSA/T&E/OSD view the reduced requirements and/or program delay? | | |
|---|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Answer Options | Response Percent | Response Count |
| As trade space | 16.2% | 11 |
| A necessary compromise | 42.6% | 29 |
| A reason to cancel the program | 20.6% | 14 |
| Unsure | 44.1% | 30 |
| Other (please specify) | | 10 |
| | <i>answered question</i> | 68 |
| | <i>skipped question</i> | 17 |

Table 25. How Reduced Requirements Were Viewed

26. How should programs be held accountable for their funding?(No graphics or tables)

27. What comments do you have about your program and OSD goals? (No graphics or tables)

Chapter 5—Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

This paper gives a general overview of the DoD PPBE process. An explanation is provided of what the CBD Program is, as well as how it is funded. The role of the JPEO and how it relates to CBD funding are included.

The program management process is complicated with ever-changing regulations, processes, guidance, and goals. Programs must follow the JCIDS process that mandates documents and events involving people in various areas over which the PM has no control. Documents and briefings must be approved by or concurred with by myriad agencies. The R&D process is by nature unpredictable and fraught with setbacks and uncertainties. Funding streams are late, intermittent, unpredictable, and ever changing. The U.S. fiscal situation, CRA, and sequestration have caused some programs to be canceled and required others to be curtailed, leaving PMs with the task of producing something that will be useful to the end user and meet new financial constraints.

Those who work in the program management areas are long-term government, military, and contractor personnel with significant experience in the area. An overwhelming majority was at the GS 13-15 level (or equivalent). The majority of the respondents to the survey expressed that CRA disbursements did not meet program needs; they met obligation goals, met expenditure goals, and regularly reported progress to upper management. Those who reported not meeting obligation goals expressed that the goals were not met because of delayed contracting efforts, program schedule slips, funding not received for which the PM was still held accountable, and late-year milestones. A comment was made that multiyear money should be treated as multiyear money. Funds set aside for salaries or taxes are not in the system as obligated.

The majority of programs do meet expenditure goals. Those who did not meet their goals expressed frustration at being held accountable to what were considered artificial goals rather than actual guidance. Delays in contract award, lag time of billing and financial reporting systems all affect expenditure rates. Programs that involve design and build spend the first year in design, which involves only labor costs. However, subcontractors must be paid and have money on hand to prepare for long lead items and other supplies, even though it may not be fully expensed for almost a year. Complex installations can take longer than 18 months. Serious expenditure plans are not considered. The PEOs seem to understand the dilemmas. Why do these issues fall on deaf ears at higher levels? In many cases, it is neither cost effective nor wise to spend all funds within one year. They do not expire within a year, so why push the issue?

PMs report their progress and defend their budgets in various ways to varied audiences. Contracting best practices, as far as payment plans designed to incentivize contractors or other government agencies, are discouraged because funds do not appear in the system as obligated. Respondents reported increased scrutiny and lack of understanding by the levels of bureaucracy. No one begrudges status reporting, but frustration is expressed at being forced to be accountable to a system that is rigid, unrealistic, and affects the ability to produce a quality product. Reductions in capabilities often put the PM at odds with the test community and the end user.

Recommendations

Most of the respondents felt that the largest issues were too much bureaucracy and late funding. Much frustration was expressed at the level of micromanaging. A common theme was to allow the PMs to run the programs as they are chartered to do. PMs/MDAs need to exercise their ability to reprogram funding within their portfolios as needed to permit efficient and effective

spending and cash flow. Perhaps the percentage of funding that is permitted to be reprogrammed should be raised.

Open-ended questions that permitted comments not captured in the survey questions. The vast numbers of suggestions and recommendations expressed have merit, save one outlier. The outlier was “funding for execution beyond a year should be de-obligated.” This comment shows a lack of understanding of the processes the PMO must follow and the outside entities with which they must work.

Respondents said they had to make the system work and this resulted in their not being efficient stewards of funding in managing programs. Another comment was that a review is needed of the usefulness of expenditure requirements vs. the expected return on investment. There was a suggestion that execution of the program be permitted based upon milestones vs. a fiscal year calendar. There were many comments regarding funding: If funding is delayed, the goals should be shifted accordingly. Obligations and expenditures should be viewed in balance with the program strategy and overall progress. RDT&E funds are 2-year funds, why should they be expected to be expended in 1 year? Survey participants agree that obligation and expenditure goals are good indicators of program health, but state that case-by-case analyses are needed, particularly with R&D programs. It does not necessarily make sense to spend all funds within 1 year. PMs should be able to redistribute funds across their portfolios or across other PMs to meet program needs. Goals should be tailored to the acquisition strategy and not a pre-set accounting drill; PMs should build a plan, track to the plan, not OSD goals; JPMs should have full funding autonomy and be held accountable for program progress. These were recommendations that have merit and were expressed often and many ways in this survey. Also recommended was communication regarding unique funding profiles based upon the program place in the acquisition cycle. If there

was an agreed upon deviation from tracking goals, that should be the new metric vs. defending the same justification month after month. The final recommendation is that goals should be program specific, not universal.

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Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

| | |
|----------|--|
| ABO | Army Budget Office |
| ACAT | Acquisition Category |
| ADM | Advanced Development and Manufacturing |
| AP | Acquisition Plan |
| ASR | Acquisition Status Report |
| ASA(ALT) | Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology |
| ASD(NCB) | Assistant of the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Chemical and Biological |
| BBP | Better Buying Power |
| CAPE | Cost Assessment Program Evaluation Office |
| CBD | Chemical Biological Defense |
| CBDP | Chemical Biological Defense Program |
| CBMS | Chemical Biological Medical Systems |
| CBO | Congressional Budget Office |
| CBRN | Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear |
| CCaRS | Comprehensive Cost and Requirement System |
| COTS | Commercial Off The Shelf |
| CPD | Capability Production Document |
| CRA | Continuing Resolution Authority |
| CWMD | Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DASC | Department of the Army Systems Coordinator |
| DAU | Defense Acquisition University |
| DCAA | Defense Contract Auditing Agency |
| DCMA | Defense Contract Management Agency |
| DFAS | Defense Finance and Accounting System |
| DMAIC | Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| DOT&E | Director, Operational Test and Evaluation |
| DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency |
| DUSA-TE | Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Testing and Evaluation(?) |

FDA.....Food and Drug Administration
 FOC.....Full Operational Capability
 FYFiscal Year
 FYDPFuture Years Defense Program
 GAOGovernment Accountability (earlier, General Accounting Office)
 GFEBsGeneral Fund Enterprise Business System
 HQ.....Headquarters
 IDIQIndefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
 IOC.....Initial Operational Capability
 JCIDSJoint Capabilities Integration Development System
 JLCMR.....Joint Lifecycle Management Review
 JPEO-CBD.....Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense
 JPMJoint Program Manager; Joint Project Manager
 JPM-BDJoint Project Manager Biological Defense
 JPM GuardianJoint Project Manager Guardian
 JPM-ISJoint Project Manager Information Systems
 JPM-NBC-CA.....Joint Project Manager Nuclear Biological Chemical Contamination Avoidance
 JPM-TMTJoint Project Manager Transformational Medical Technologies
 JROC.....Joint Requirements Oversight Council
 JRO-CBRNDJoint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense
 JSCBISJoint Service Chemical Biological Information System
 JUONSJoint Urgent Operations Needs Statement
 KO.....Contracting Officer
 KPPKey Performance Parameter
 KSA.....Key Systems Attributes
 MIPR.....Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request
 MRAPMine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicles)
 MS.....Milestone
 MYR O&EMidyear Review Obligations and Expenditures
 OGAsOther Government Agencies
 OGEs.....Other Government Entities

O&M.....Operation and Maintenance
 OMBOffice of Management and Budget
 O&O.....Operational and Organizational
 OSDOffice of the Secretary of Defense
 OTOperational Testing
 OTAOperational Test Agencies
 PCM.....Primary Containment Module
 PDProgram Director
 PEOsProgram Executive Offices
 PM.....Program or Project Management
 PMO.....Program Management Office
 POM.....Program Objective Memorandum
 PPBE.....Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution
 RDT&E.....Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
 SETASystems, Engineering, and Technical Assistance
 SMESubject Matter Expert
 SOPStanding Operating Procedure
 STANFINSStandard Finance System
 TACOM.....U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command
 T&ETesting and Evaluation
 TOATotal Obligation Authority
 TRL.....Technology Readiness Level
 UFR.....Unfunded Request
 USD(AT&L).....Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
 WAWF.....Wide Area Work Flow
 WMDWeapons of Mass Destruction

