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Speed of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)2018-08-21T16:00:00Z Fields/DAU_Logistics Defense ATL Hand May June 2015_20170209.jpg, Fields/DAU_Logistics Defense ATL Hand May June 2015_20170209.jpg Fields/DAU_Logistics Defense ATL Hand May June 2015_20170209.jpg<div class="ExternalClass55884FEDBCF24ACDA9E54AB2F2B16D75">My previous blog on “The Spectrum of FMS Arrangements” highlighted the set of FMS activities that are of potential interest to DoD senior leaders, allied and friendly nations, and industry stakeholders. While all FMS arrangements are important at some level, complex Systems & Equipment transactions during the competitive evaluation and source selection phase have historically attracted the most attention. Why? Most informed observes believe the following key areas – which tend to be “weighted” in value based on each key stakeholder’s perspective -- are responsible: <ul> <li>Enhancement of long-term military capability</li> <li>Strengthening of overall political/military relationships</li> <li>Economic and industrial impact (which normally extends throughout the acquisition life-cycle (20-30 years or more))</li> </ul> <br> As a result, while FMS System acquisition transactions of this type are small in number, their importance to key stakeholders has disproportionate impact on the overall perception of the “Speed of FMS” that is undeniable. This blog examines the key factors that affect the Speed of FMS for this highly valued set of FMS arrangements.<br> <br> <strong><u>Demand</u></strong><br> <br> In general, the Speed of FMS “Demand” signal — including the composite set of key stakeholder objectives, desired results, and relative priority for a new System (or major upgrade) — comes from one or more of the following sources: <ul> <li>U.S. Government (USG) Policy Community</li> <li>FMS Customer Nations</li> <li>DOD Combatant Commanders (COCOMs)</li> <li>U.S. Industry</li> </ul> <br> In most situations, all of these entities think they are important — and they are! — so they believe their particular FMS transaction (or set of transactions) at any given time is a top priority. Moreover, while each entity can logically establish demand priorities among <em><u>their</u></em> set of FMS transactions, it’s a huge challenge to establish collective, system-wide FMS priorities. This observation is, in fact, confirmed by the recently issued USG <strong><a href="">Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy Fact Sheet</a></strong>, which emphasizes that “<em>working with partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements and energizing a whole-of-government effort to expedite transfers that support these essential foreign policy and national security objectives</em>” is of paramount importance.<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight #1</em></strong><br> <br> “Speed of FMS” is a misnomer! In fact, FMS customer nations — supported by USG/DOD key stakeholders in most cases — are actually interested in Performance, Cost, <em><u>and</u></em> Speed (Schedule). In other words, what they really want is optimal (or at least acceptable) outcomes in P C & S (not just Speed), especially for new/upgraded Systems.<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight #2 </em></strong><br> <br> While the CAT Policy initiative cited above will focus on improving the status quo, the overall USG prioritization process works currently works much like an airline that only has an “A” boarding group for all the FMS Price & Availability (P&A) and Letter of Offer (LOA) transactions at any given point in time. Since there are an estimated 2500 - 3000 (or more) P&As, LOAs, and LOA amendments processed per year, this poses an immense prioritization challenge for the USG. The CAT Policy implementation team has their work cut out for them in this area!<br> <br> <strong><u>Supply</u></strong><br> <br> The DoD acquisition workforce is the only source of “Supply” that has both the legal authority and professional capabilities to conduct Systems acquisition efforts on behalf of FMS customers. Often forgotten is the fact that this is the same DoD acquisition workforce that develops, produces, and sustains Systems (and everything else) for U.S. Warfighters, International Cooperative Program (ICP) partners, and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) deliveries to allied/friendly nations funded by U.S. Title 10 appropriations.<br> <br> As a result, DoD Program Management Offices (PMOs) and supporting functional expert teams — Engineers, Logisticians, Contracting Officers, etc. — must address up to four (4) simultaneous Demand signals (U.S., ICP, FMS and BPC) for System-related P C & S acquisition outcomes on a daily basis.<br> <br> As noted above, the USG currently lacks a coherent FMS prioritization process, let alone a comprehensive USG Security Cooperation (ICP, FMS, BPC and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)) priority allocation scheme. As a result, the “squeaky wheel” approach is used, i.e., the key stakeholders with the most clout that squeak the loudest get the highest PMO acquisition priority. Well, at least for a while, until the next key stakeholder squeaky wheel demand comes along (which inevitably happens at some point).<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight #3</em></strong><br> <br> Lack of an overall USG FMS/Security Cooperation prioritization system -- in combination with prioritization of U.S. Warfighter requirements -- means that <em><u>everything</u></em> appears to be a high priority Systems acquisition requirement at the PMO level. As as a result, DoD PMOs are routinely forced to set priorities themselves when talent, time, and (in some situations) funding availability pose System acquisition constraints that affect competing stakeholders.<br> <br> <strong><u>Program Management Office (PMO) Triage</u></strong><br> <br> In such stressful situations, PMOs often use variations of the triage method (think ‘hospital’) to try to keep as many Systems acquisition transactions (‘patients’) alive and functioning while attempting to keep what is often a plethora of squeaky wheel stakeholders (‘relatives and friends’) mollified. Here is typical PMO “A/B/C” triage perspective:<br> <br> A) <strong><em>U.S. Warfighters</em></strong><br> <br> B) <strong><em>International Cooperative Program </em></strong><em>partner nations</em> (who have invested in the System’s acquisition in some way)<br> <br> C) <strong><em>Either FMS or Building Partner Capacity</em></strong> customer nations (depending on a mix of stakeholder prioritization and acquisition-specific factors unique to each transaction mechanism)<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight #4</em></strong><br> <br> When acquisition resources become scarce at the PMO level and there are multiple stakeholder demands, FMS (and BPC) normally default to the C) priority level.<br> <br> <strong><u>FMS Systems Acquisition Prioritization </u></strong><br> <br> As described in my previous blog, FMS System-level transactions fall into five (5) general categories. When a PMO (if one exists!) applies the overall triage approach above combined with the following FMS-specific prioritization criteria here’s what normally happens:<br> <br> 1) <strong><em>Program of Record (POR)</em></strong><br> <br> Good news! If an FMS customer nation is willing to purchase the System in the same configuration as the DoD -- and if there are minimally required Defense Exportability Features (DEF) configuration mods -- the FMS nation usually ends up with an A)1) priority (same as US and any relevant ICP or BPC nations).<br> <br> 2) <strong><em>Rapid Acquisition “POR”</em></strong><br> <br> Hmm ... the DoD Rapid Acquisition process sends a Demand signal that the U.S. Warfighters need the desired System (or major System modification) ASAP. This means the program isn’t a “POR” program in all of its facets. As a result, the Rapid Acquisition “POR” System (or mod) will normally be designed and developed as a “U.S. Only” System without DEF, and with little or no FMS Total Package Approach (TPA) logistics support available. If an FMS version of the System is even feasible, it’s going to be at best a C)2) priority for the PMO (and could be even lower).<br> <br> 3) <strong><em>Non-Standard POR</em></strong><br> <br> Roll the dice on this one ... The more Non-Standard the FMS version of the System is, the bigger the challenge the PMO faces. However, there are two potentially radically different prioritization outcomes:<br> <br> - If DOD Component senior leaders decide they can leverage off the FMS customer nation’s Non-Standard POR investment and use it for future U.S. System configuration upgrades, the PMO will likely be directed by DOD stakeholders to give it a higher priority (even A)1) in some cases).<br> <br> - If the DOD Component is not interested in the FMS customer nation’s Non-Standard POR configuration it’s normally a C)3) priority at best.<br> <br> 4) <strong><em>Excess Defense Articles (EDA)</em></strong><br> <br> As a tennis player in his 60s, I can confirm the fact that life is tougher when you get older … at least in athletics. Unfortunately, this is also for aging System acquisition programs. PMOs are reduced in size, then eventually phased out, and their supporting functional personnel (Engineers, Logisticians, Contracting Officers, etc.) are re-deployed to new development/production programs. Even DoD Logistics and Sustainment organizations often stop supporting Systems once they are no longer used by DOD active and reserve forces. When this happens, FMS customer nations that are still operating the System can no longer rely on DOD System upgrades and TPA logistics and sustainment, so the FMS customers have <u>no priority</u> since there is no longer anyone in the DOD acquisition workforce to answer or support them.<br> <br> 5) <strong><em>Non-POR</em></strong><br> <br> Houston, we have a problem ... By definition, there is no US requirement for the System so there is no DoD PMO! Industry has to try to get DoD senior leaders to assign a PMO to “help” which may or may not be possible. Even if it is, the assigned (often against its will!) PMO will be forced to spend an inordinate amount of time to try to figure out what the Non-POR System is and help convince USG Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure authorities that it should be offered for export (which they may, in fact, oppose themselves). In an A/B/C priority world Non-PORs are a D.<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight # 5</em></strong><br> <br> Many of the previous USG/DOD level Security Cooperation Reform efforts have focused on the FMS-specific policy and process steps that have led to improved FMS System acquisition outcomes. This aspect of the end-to-end FMS Systems acquisition process has already been largely optimized.<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight # 6</em></strong><br> <br> The relatively small number of Security Cooperation Reform efforts that have focused on DOD Acquisition community FMS activities have concentrated on a few specific FMS contracting policies. Many argue that these “reforms” in the FMS contracting area, while no doubt well intended, have actually created additional challenges for PMOs and their functional support organizations (including Contracting) without materially improving FMS System acquisition outcomes.<br> <br> <strong><em>Insight # 7</em></strong><br> <br> The net effect of all of these factors means that most day-to-day priorities for FMS Systems acquisition efforts are established by the DOD Acquisition (“Supply”) rather than the USG/DOD Policy (“Demand”) community. There are many situations when USG/DOD senior leaders in the Policy community weigh in at a high level with USD(A&S) or DOD Military Department senior leaders on specific, high priority FMS System transactions. However, in most cases – i.e., 90% of the time (or more) -- FMS System acquisition priorities are established by the DOD Acquisition community at the PMO level using the triage approach described above.<br> <br> <strong><u>Observations and Conclusion</u></strong><br> <br> Previous USG/DoD attempts to improve FMS performance have, for the most part, concentrated on the following primary processes: <ul> <li>FMS LOR-to-LOA Process (as previously mentioned)</li> <li>USG Export Control Reform</li> <li>USG/DoD Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) System Reform</li> <li>FMS Contracting Policy</li> <li>Implementation of the Defense Exportability Features (DEF) program</li> </ul> <br> Despite substantial progress in many of these areas, improvements in these individual “parts” of the end-to end FMS process have not had the desired impact on the “whole” vis-à-vis desired Speed of FMS outcomes. Moreover, based on a DoD acquisition workforce perspective, one would expect significant Speed of FMS problems in complex FMS Systems transactions based on the prioritization problems and PMO-level incentives/disincentives described in this blog.<br> <br> Accordingly, it appears that the greatest potential for achieving a quantum leap in FMS Systems acquisition performance lies in exploring the DOD Security Cooperation - DOD Acquisition community relationship to identify areas that have the highest potential to improve future outcomes. My next blog will offer some suggestions on this topic.<br> <br> Until then, Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/Speed-of-Foreign-Military-Sales-(FMS)
The Spectrum of FMS Arrangements Spectrum of FMS Arrangements2018-08-11T16:00:00Z Fields/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg, Fields/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg Fields/DAU_International Acquisition UN_20170104.jpg<div class="ExternalClass4A5B0CA4007B4C279B85E1911C8E47E5">There is a lot of interest in U.S. and international defense community these days on the “Speed of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)” but what does this phrase really mean? Much of the current commentary on the Speed of FMS makes it seem like FMS transactions are monolithic – but they are not! In fact, the characteristics of the various types FMS arrangements between the U.S. and allied/nations vary widely. Based on recent discussions among Defense Acquisition University faculty members, industry contributors, and International Acquisition Career Path (IACP) students, here are few thoughts on how to categorize different kinds of FMS transactions that could eventually lead to improvements in U.S. Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DOD) domestic and international acquisition outcomes.<br> <br> Why should we care? Our contention is that, similar to most complex problems, improving overall FMS results will require a critical thinking assessment leading to identification and analysis of the set of key factors actually causing suboptimal FMS acquisition outcomes.<br> <br> <strong><u>FMS – Overall Categories</u></strong><br> Accordingly, here’s our perspective on the broad categories of FMS activities that should be subject to a more detailed “cause and effect” analysis: <ul> <li><strong>Systems/Equipment</strong> (including platforms, ordnance, sensors, and other combat and combat support equipment)</li> <li><strong>Logistics and Sustainment of Systems/Equipment</strong> (which comprise the “Total Package Approach” (TPA) that DOD provides FMS customers throughout the acquisition life-cycle)</li> <li><strong>Other</strong> (including off-the-shelf commercially available equipment and commodities that allied and friendly nations decide to purchase via FMS versus Direct Commercial Sale (DCS))</li> </ul> <br> <strong><u>FMS – Acquisition Perspectives</u></strong><br> The Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have conducted analyses of the type and volume of FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) in recent years that provide some useful insights. However, these analyses have not viewed FMS transactions through the lens of the defense acquisition workforce. From an acquisition perspective, there are five (5) major categories of FMS transactions that comprise most (if not all) of the FMS-related activities conducted by DOD Component International Program Organizations (IPOs), Program Management Offices (PMOs) and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), and Logistics & Sustainment organizations:<br> <br> <strong>Program of Record (POR)</strong> – Systems/Equipment programs with validated DOD Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements being conducted in accordance with normal (Model 1 and 2) Defense Acquisition System (DAS) 5000 series policies and practices.<br> <br> <strong>Rapid Acquisition “POR”</strong> – Systems/Equipment programs with validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) being conducted using accelerated (Model 4) DAS 5000 series policies and practices. Due to the accelerated nature of such programs, some (but not all) of the normal full spectrum (Model 1 and 2) POR activities are completed.<br> <br> <strong>Non-Standard POR -- </strong>Systems/Equipment requirements changes and associated configuration modifications desired by an FMS customer that substantially deviate from the DOD POR configuration. The greater the breadth and depth of the deviation from the DOD POR configuration, the more Non-Standard the FMS configuration differs from the DOD POR.<br> <br> <strong>Excess Defense Articles (EDA)</strong> – Systems/Equipment previously produced by a PMO/IPT and prime contractor that no longer exists due to lack of any further U.S. acquisition requirements. Eventually, once DOD is no longer using the system in either active or reserve forces, DOD Logistics/Sustainment organizations will stop supporting the system (even if FMS customers are still operating it).<br> <br> <strong>Non-POR</strong> – Systems/Equipment desired by an FMS customer developed and/or produced by U.S industry where no DOD POR exists at all. For Non-POR programs, by definition, there is neither a DOD Component IPO nor a PMO/IPT with assigned responsibility.<br> <br> <strong><u>Observations and Insights</u></strong><br> As outlined above, DOD acquisition workforce responsibilities for the various types of FMS transactions vary widely. The most typically used approach -- which describes the spectrum of FMS LOAs as “Simple,” “Standard,” and “Complex” (see <strong><a href="">GAO Report on DoD FMS Improvements</a></strong>, p. 30) – is too simplistic. Within the DOD acquisition workforce, DOD Component IPO and PMO/IPT abilities – as well as incentives/disincentives – to support Non-Standard POR, EDA, and Non-POR FMS transactions have a significant impact on Speed of FMS outcomes.<br> <br> We must change the existing false narrative that FMS is monolithic -- or can be adequately categorized simply by FMS LOA type -- to have any chance of achieving fundamental, system-wide improvements in the overall FMS acquisition outcomes. Characterizing FMS transactions in a way that both the USG/DOD Security Cooperation and DOD Acquisition communities can understand and accept is an essential first step. Once this is accomplished, these key USG stakeholders, FMS customer nations, and U.S./foreign industry will be in a much better position to assess potential Speed of FMS improvements based on rational analysis rather than intuition or emotion.<br> <br> My next blog will use the Spectrum of FMS Arrangements described above to explore and assess the key FMS transaction variables that have historically been of greatest interest to U.S. policy makers, FMS customer nations, and industry.<br> <br> Until then, Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/The-Spectrum-of-FMS-Arrangements
U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy Implementation Conventional Arms Transfer Policy Implementation2018-07-19T16:00:00Z,<div class="ExternalClass3230D2049ED24F1F8700579A069D0DCF">The U.S. Department of State announced on July 16<sup>th</sup> that the White House has approved a Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy Implementation Plan. For those “inquiring minds” that would like to know more about this, here’s a brief summary based on the <a href=""><strong>State Department Fact Sheet</strong></a> on this subject currently available on their website.<br> <br> From an overall perspective, USG implementation activities will focus on three broad, mutually supportive lines of effort designed to achieve the objectives outlined in the revised White House CAT Policy issued on April 19, 2018: <ul> <li><em><strong>Prioritizing Strategic Competition</strong></em></li> <li><em><strong>Organizing for Success</strong></em></li> <li><em><strong>Creating Conducive Environments</strong></em></li> </ul> The Implementation Plan will also focus on seven (7) CAT policy implementation “tasks” that the U.S. Government (USG) will pursue with support from allied/friendly nations and U.S. industry. I have summarized these -- plus provided a few of my own thoughts on where such efforts could affect the DoD acquisition workforce (in general) and International Acquisition Career Path (IACP) members (in particular) -- in the months ahead: <ol> <li><em><strong>Working with Partners and Allies on Priorities</strong></em> – One of the biggest challenges the DoD acquisition workforce faces in the International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) area is the breadth of enterprise-wide activities which includes thousands of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, hundreds of International Cooperative Program (ICP) agreements, hundreds of Building Partner Capacity (BPC) transactions, and tens of thousands of State and Commerce export approvals that require DoD inputs. Finding a better way within the USG – a big and diverse operation -- to identify and expedite the most critical allied/friendly nation capability requirements is a laudable CAT Policy objective. How to best accomplish this, however, will likely be a challenge since USG interagency players in the IA&E area have historically used an organizational interest-based, positional bargaining approach to set priorities and allocate resources. Clearly there must be a better way, but what alternatives should be considered, and will key USG organizations agree to fundamental changes to the status quo?</li> <li><em><strong>Improving our Ability to Compete with Adversaries</strong></em> – The CAT Policy objective in this area is clearly defined – finding ways to more effectively compete against systems offered for sale by our “adversaries” (list not provided). See 3. through 7. below for details on the “how to” aspects of potentially achieving this highly desirable outcome.</li> <li><em><strong>Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S.-Made Systems </strong></em>– Making U.S systems more competitive in the global defense marketplace – whether they are competing against those offered by “adversaries,” friendly nations, or allies – is clearly one of the main focus areas of the revised CAT Policy. The Fact Sheet mentions three promising areas where improvements may be possible: a) working with industry to design and build exportability into our systems; b) expanding USG support for sale of Non-Program of Record (POR) -- think “industry customized” rather than “standard DoD” -- systems; and, c) incentivizing increased DoD/industry production capacity and timely delivery. Spoiler Alert … the <u>DoD acquisition workforce</u> – through our contracts with U.S. industry -- is the <u>key USG player responsible</u> for achieving all three of these!</li> <li><em><strong>Updating the Policy and Regulatory Framework</strong></em> – Well, at least they didn’t use the word “reform” again this time! However, it looks like the “usual suspects” – including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Missile Technology Control Regime – are going to be scrutinized yet again. While the banks of the Potomac are (metaphorically) littered with the bones of the previous reformers in these areas, hopefully those involved in the CAT Policy-related efforts to improve status quo performance in this area can take comfort that in the broad sweep of history, occasionally things really do change. Fortunately, it’s likely that the DoD acquisition workforce will only play a supporting role since other USG organizations, most notably the State and Commerce Departments, are responsible for these policy and regulatory frameworks.</li> <li><em><strong>Expanding and Enhancing USG Advocacy and Trade Promotion </strong></em>– From a DoD acquisition workforce perspective, we’ve been supporting U.S. industry in the global defense marketplace for many years in traditional IA&E areas such as “standard” FMS, ICPs, and BPC. However, it appears that the Implementation Plan will ask the DoD acquisition workforce (among others in the USG) to “up their game” by helping support U.S. industry Non-Standard FMS, Non-POR FMS, and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) advocacy and trade promotion in the future as well. Potential DoD acquisition workforce and IACP resource issues/constraints could arise depending on the breadth and depth of support to industry that’s envisioned … something worth monitoring.</li> <li><em><strong>Working to Ensure Barriers to U.S. Entry are Reduced </strong></em>– The barriers mentioned here are ones established and used by other countries – even allied and friendly nations – that cause U.S. industry problems in the FMS and DCS areas (ICP and BPC much less so). The most well-known (and often vexing) barrier – other countries’ offset requirements – has been the subject of many bilateral USG-foreign government moral suasion discussions over the years. A few DoD IACP personnel are involved in offset policy debates at policy level, but many others have to deal with program-level offset impacts on a daily basis, especially those in DoD Program Management Offices and Contracting Organizations responsible for FMS contracting. In view of the problems they often cause, it would make sense for the DoD acquisition workforce to support further USG policy and practice changes to help minimize the adverse impact of foreign offset requirements in FMS and FMS/DCS hybrid programs.</li> <li><strong><em>Continuing to Improve our Arms Transfer Processes</em></strong> – Most informed observers believe that additional improvements in key USG arms transfer processes are needed and can be achieved. While IA&E contracting and procurement processes are mentioned in the Fact Sheet, there are others – most notably the set of thirteen (13) <strong><a href="/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/TSFD%20Pipes%20Chart%20(.pdf%20version).pdf?Web=1">USG/DoD Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) processes</a></strong> and how they work together (or not) to identify and implement defense exportability requirements in U.S. systems – that deserve further attention.</li> </ol> The State Department’s Fact Sheet appears to indicate that there are additional CAT Policy Implementation Plan documents circulating within the USG. If so, these could provide additional insights and further details into the specific activities that are envisioned on a task-by-task basis. If/when these documents become available, we will do our best to keep DoD acquisition workforce and IACP members apprised of future efforts intended to improve International Acquisition & Exportability outcomes for the U.S. and allied/friendly nations around the globe.<br> <br> Until next time … Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/U-S--Conventional-Arms-Transfer-Policy-Implementation
The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) II Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) II Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)2018-06-03T16:00:00Z Super Small.jpg, Super Small.jpg Super Small.jpg<div class="ExternalClass7E327D0F27A2473889C911F5A4B69960">The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is a DoD-wide international cooperative Science & Technology (S&T) effort that involves the defense S&T organizations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. While TTCP was originally established in the 1950s it remains a viable and vibrant cooperative S&T engagement program in today's 21st century global defense S&T environment.<br> <br> A new TTCP II MOU entered into effect in April 2018 replacing an earlier version TTCP MOU from the mid-1990s. This new TTCP MOU provides a legal framework for international cooperative efforts by the five TTCP Participants across the full spectrum of defense S&T activities including​: <ul> <li>Establishment of a five-nation TTCP Steering Committee that focuses on information sharing and alignment the S&T activities of all TTCP Participants through a TTCP group structure supported by all five nations' S&T subject matter experts.</li> <li>Conducting specific cooperative TTCP Activities authorized by the TTCP Steering Committee under mutually acceptableTerms of Reference (TORs) among two or more TTCP Participants.</li> <li>S&T Equipment and Material Transfers (loans) among two or more TTCP Participants in furtherance of their national S&T objectives and program of work.</li> <li>Formal International Cooperative Program (ICP) S&T Project Arrangements entered into among two or more TTCP Participants.</li> </ul> The new TTCP II MOU provides a basis for continuing international S&T cooperation over the next twenty-five years that will harmonize and employ the defense technology bases of these longstanding allies in support their national defense objectives and future coalition operations. Consult your national TTCP points of contact listed on the <strong><a href="">TTCP website </a></strong>for further details.<br> <br> Until next time ...<br> Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/The-Technical-Cooperation-Program-(TTCP)-II-Memorandum-of-Understanding-(MOU)