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The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) II Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) II Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)2018-06-03T16:00:00Z Super Small.jpg, Super Small.jpg Super Small.jpg<div class="ExternalClass7E327D0F27A2473889C911F5A4B69960">The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is a DoD-wide international cooperative Science & Technology (S&T) effort that involves the defense S&T organizations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K. and U.S. While TTCP was originally established in the 1950s it remains a viable and vibrant cooperative S&T engagement program in today's 21st century global defense S&T environment.<br> <br> A new TTCP II MOU entered into effect in April 2018 replacing an earlier version TTCP MOU from the mid-1990s. This new TTCP MOU provides a legal framework for international cooperative efforts by the five TTCP Participants across the full spectrum of defense S&T activities including​: <ul> <li>Establishment of a five-nation TTCP Steering Committee that focuses on information sharing and alignment the S&T activities of all TTCP Participants through a TTCP group structure supported by all five nations' S&T subject matter experts.</li> <li>Conducting specific cooperative TTCP Activities authorized by the TTCP Steering Committee under mutually acceptableTerms of Reference (TORs) among two or more TTCP Participants.</li> <li>S&T Equipment and Material Transfers (loans) among two or more TTCP Participants in furtherance of their national S&T objectives and program of work.</li> <li>Formal International Cooperative Program (ICP) S&T Project Arrangements entered into among two or more TTCP Participants.</li> </ul> The new TTCP II MOU provides a basis for continuing international S&T cooperation over the next twenty-five years that will harmonize and employ the defense technology bases of these longstanding allies in support their national defense objectives and future coalition operations. Consult your national TTCP points of contact listed on the <strong><a href="">TTCP website </a></strong>for further details.<br> <br> Until next time ...<br> Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/The-Technical-Cooperation-Program-(TTCP)-II-Memorandum-of-Understanding-(MOU)
Revised U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy2018-05-17T16:00:00Z Reaper.jpg, Reaper.jpg Reaper.jpg<div class="ExternalClass89F31C2452B44F83A5F5FB6EFEDB9E3A">For those of you who may have missed the defense media reports, the President recently issued a major update to the U.S. Government’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy on April 19, 2018. When new policies like this are published, DAU learners often ask “how will this policy affect me (if at all)?” Great question! Having worked in the DoD International Acquisition and Exportability (IA&E) area for over 25 years, here are a few thoughts that may help you assess the updated CAT policy’s potential impact now and in the future.<br> <br> Probably the most important reason to be mindful of this policy’s potential impact is that research has shown that over 80% of DoD system development, production, and sustainment programs engage in one or more of the following aspects of IA&E during their life-cycle: <ul> <li><strong><em>IA&E Planning and Analysis</em></strong> -- The conduct of program-level IA&E Assessments and development of Acquisition Strategy - International Considerations sections by Program Managers is now required by Title 10 and the DoD 5000 series.</li> <li><strong><em>International Cooperative Programs (ICPs)</em></strong> – International defense government-to-government partnership agreements include programs such as NATO SeaSparrow, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) and many more.</li> <li><strong><em>Sales and Transfers</em></strong> – Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), and hybrid program activities are widespread and include most of DoD major programs as well smaller-scale acquisition programs and projects.</li> <li><strong><em>Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) & Export Control</em></strong> – All of DoD’s international acquisition efforts require various types of U.S. Government (USG) approval(s) in these legally required areas.</li> <li><strong><em>Defense Exportability Integration</em></strong> – This ‘new kid on the block’ effort – established in Title 10 beginning in 2011 – is critically important to the achievement of the new U.S. National Security Strategy and U.S. Government Security Cooperation goals and objectives.</li> <li><strong><em>International Contracting</em></strong> – Both “domestic” and international acquisition programs rely on international sources of supply from the global defense marketplace from the prime contractor to supplier level.</li> </ul> <br> Each and every one of the IA&E activities will be governed by the recently revised CAT policy to some greater or lesser degree. That said, the key question knowledgeable observers are asking is “how does the new policy differ from its predecessor?” Here are a few key (and potential) changes between the 2014 and 2018 version CAT policies that DoD acquisition workforce members should keep in mind as they plan and implement ongoing and future IA&E activities: <ul> <li><strong><em>Industry Support</em></strong>: One of the policy’s most significant changes is the markedly increased emphasis on supporting industry’s international efforts. <em>“When a proposed transfer is in the national security interest … the executive branch will advocate strongly on behalf of United States companies.”</em> It appears that the Administration – through the National Security Council, State, Defense, and Commerce – has high expectations regarding “deckplate level” changes in workforce attitude and actions in this area.</li> <li><strong><em>Streamlining Philosophy</em></strong>: The Administration has also signaled its willingness to engage in and support IA&E and acquisition-related business process changes in support of industry. <em>“The executive branch will also streamline procedures, clarify regulations, increase contracting predictability and flexibility, and maximize the ability of the United States industry to grow and support allies and partners.”</em> Note that this statement focuses on U.S. Government streamlining efforts that will support industry’s international defense activities rather than emphasizing the need for business process improvements across the full spectrum of USG Security Cooperation activities.</li> <li><strong><em>Streamlining Specifics</em></strong>: What is less clear is how this emphasis on streamlining in the U.S. Government and DoD IA&E processes to support industry’s international defense activities will actually play out in practice. <em>“Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum [the executive branch] shall submit to the President … a proposed action plan to implement the policy set forth in … this memorandum.”</em> Hmmm … since “the devil is usually found in the details,” stay tuned!</li> <li><strong><em>Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Policy</em></strong>: The policy also mentions the need for significant changes in UAS sales and transfers decision making. <em>“Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum, the [executive branch] shall submit to the President … a proposed initiative to align our unmanned aerial systems (UAS) export policy more closely with our national and economic security interests. The initiative should address the status of, and recommend next steps for, [Military Technology Control Regime] MTCR adoption of revised controls for MTCR Category I UAS, consistent with the UAS export policy.”</em> Notably, the State Department issued a new “<a href="">U.S. Policy on the Export of Unmanned Aerial Systems</a>” in parallel with the White House publication of the revised CAT policy on April 19th. However, there are media reports about more potential U.S. Government policy changes to make exports of U.S.-origin MTCR Category I UAS ‘easier’ so stay tuned on this as well.</li> </ul> <br> From an overall standpoint, it’s clear that the Administration wants the executive branch to ‘lean forward’ on future U.S defense sales. What is less clear is the mechanics of how achieving this objective will actually be accomplished by key players in the U.S. Government – especially in State, Defense, and Commerce – under the National Security Council’s leadership and guidance.<br> <br> Moreover, the National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) in recent years have contained several provisions intended to improve – “streamline” if you will -- the U.S. Government’s overall Security Cooperation performance, particularly in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) area. Perhaps some synergies will occur as both the NDAA and CAT policy changes begin to effect the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS), and other DoD policy directives and instructions that govern DoD’s IA&E and Security Cooperation activities.<br> <br> We will continue to do our best here at DAU to monitor future CAT policy implementation activities -- and make you aware of key developments – in the coming months.<br> <br> Until next time … Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/Revised-U-S--Conventional-Arms-Transfer-Policy
Critical Thinking and Acquisition Improvements Thinking and Acquisition Improvements2018-03-19T16:00:00Z, Fields/DAU_Logistics Defense ATL Hand May June 2015_20170209.jpg<div class="ExternalClassBA2BF9F0D3F64198A5F7A8E4FDB3389A">One of the most enjoyable aspects of supporting the DoD Acquisition Workforce as a DAU professor is being asked to help respond to thought-provoking questions from members who are grappling with tough challenges. I was recently asked to participate in a discussion of the advantages – and potential pitfalls – of using acquisition Best Practices in the workplace as part of a DAU Mission Assistance (MA) effort.<br> <br> I provided a few thoughts based on my work in the International Acquisition and Exportability (IA&E) area during DAU’s meeting with the MA customer organization, specifically in the area of IA&E Best Practices. However, I found the overall discussion fascinating from an applied critical thinking perspective. Perhaps you will as well.<br> <br> <strong>Thank You for Arguing … </strong><br> <br> The fun began immediately since the DAU faculty members involved in the discussion with the MA customer had divergent views on the topic from the beginning: <ul> <li>Some believed <strong><em>Best Practices</em></strong> were inherently beneficial and useful</li> <li>Others noted that <strong><em>Tailoring</em></strong> (which is generally considered part of the overall set of Best Practices) could be beneficial in many circumstances</li> <li>Someone else highlighted the potential utility of <strong><em>Lessons Learned</em></strong> (put another way, historical Best Practices and Worst Practices)</li> <li>One individual argued strongly that excessive focus on the use Best Practices could actually stifle <strong><em>Creativity and Innovation</em></strong> within the acquisition workforce (clearly an undesirable outcome)</li> </ul> <br> Rather than just shrugging our shoulders and leaving it with the classic DAU answer – “it depends” – we pressed on …<br> <br> <strong>Hegel’s Dialectic</strong><br> <br> Some of you may vaguely remember this philosophical construct, which is a critical thinking approach still used to address challenging issues today. Using the dialectic approach helped everyone better understand their divergent points of view: <ul> <li><strong><em>Thesis</em></strong>: Use of Best Practices – including Tailoring and Lessons Learned -- leads to optimal acquisition outcomes.</li> <li><strong><em>Antithesis</em></strong>: Creativity and Innovation implemented through cultural change leads to optimal acquisition outcomes.</li> <li><strong><em>Synthesis</em></strong>: Read on … (spoiler alert) you’ll find this at the end of this blog …</li> </ul> <br> <strong>Storming and Norming</strong><br> <br> As the discussion continued, various faculty members argued on behalf of their perspectives on the matter. However, as the group transitioned into the “norming” phase of group dynamics, a few key concepts that hadn’t previously considered started to emerge and mature. One of the most useful was an adaptation of Colin Powell’s staff guidance to tell him:<br> <br> <strong>1)</strong> What you know.<br> <strong>2)</strong> What you think you know.<br> <strong>3)</strong> What you don’t know (but you think someone else might).<br> <strong>4)</strong> What is unknowable (at least from your perspective).<br> <br> Once General Powell and his staff discussed and agreed on areas 1) through 4), they were both in a much better position to seek assistance, if necessary, then develop solutions to the problems they were facing.<br> <br> When you combine General Powell’s approach with the typical methods used to tackle complex acquisition challenges it appears that: <ul> <li><strong><em>Best Practices</em></strong> should be used to help address challenging situations if you believe you are somewhere in areas 1) through 3); while,</li> <li><strong><em>Creativity and Innovation</em></strong>, while useful in all areas, should be primarily used to develop solutions in areas 3) and 4).</li> </ul> <br> While this is a useful construct, it’s still pretty abstract. How do I know whether my program (or set of programs) is in areas 1), 2), 3), or 4)? What approach should I use to evaluate the acquisition challenges inherent in my program (or portfolio of programs)?<br> <br> According to Daniel Levitin, the author of <em>The Organized Mind – Thinking Straight in the Age of Information Overload</em>, the “primary mission of teachers must shift from the dissemination of raw information to training a cluster of mental skills that revolve around critical thinking.” Accordingly, here are few ideas we hope will help you more effectively and efficiently assess the acquisition program challenges you’re facing.<br> <br> <strong>The Acquisition OODA Loop</strong><br> <br> One of the most famous decision analysis tools around is Colonel John Boyd’s <strong>OODA</strong> loop: <strong>O</strong>bserve, <strong>O</strong>rient, <strong>D</strong>ecide, <strong>A</strong>ct. In my experience, acquisition professionals don’t always spend enough time on the <strong>O</strong>bserve and <strong>O</strong>rient steps due to a mix of time constraints and over-reliance on assumptions rooted in “conventional wisdom.” This can lead to elegant solutions to the wrong problem. Happens a lot – more often than it should, really.<br> <br> We recognize that you don’t have infinite time and resources to analyze the wide variety of acquisition challenges you face in your workplace environment – far from it! However, as Levitin points out, there is a way to conduct an Observe/Orient assessment of complex problems not often mentioned in critical thinking literature. How? Start by establishing reasonable boundary conditions, then generate an initial set of “imperfect answers” to assess the breadth and depth of challenges you’re facing. You can do this using knowledge and expertise that is locally available, then use your initial Observe/Orient results to seek help (if needed) and ultimately form the basis of future Decide/Act activities. Let’s explore how you could approach such an effort …<br> <br> <strong>Acquisition Improvements – Observing & Orienting</strong><br> <br> Since DoD acquisition programs vary widely, here’s a simple “rule of three’ Observing/Orienting approach our discussion group came up:<br> <br> <strong><em>Key Acquisition Factors</em></strong>: <u>Importance</u>, <u>Complexity</u>, and <u>Risk</u> (ICR)<br> <br> <strong><em>Analytical Approach</em></strong>: Conduct a group analysis of these factors as they apply to your program or – for higher level managers – your portfolio of programs (small or large). Use the group members’ expertise to assign subjective Likert scale (1-5 or 1-10) values leading to a summary level High-Medium-Low-Unknown (HMLU) determination for each factor. If a more fine-grained analysis is desired, your group could even assign weighting values to each factor to emphasize which factors are most and least important to the desired acquisition outcome.<br> <br> <strong>Typical Analytical Results</strong>:<br> <br> <strong><em>Single Program</em></strong>:<br> <br> For an evaluation of an individual acquisition program, here’s a potential Program Manager (PM)-level Observe/Orient analytical outcome that one could envision in an ACAT I or ACAT II Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase program about halfway through the phase:<br> <br> <em><u>Importance</u></em>: The user has demonstrated a willingness to accept trade-offs in JCIDS KPP requirements to achieve the desired Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date.<br> <br> <em><u>Complexity</u></em>: There are a substantial number of programmatic and technical challenges that markedly exceed legacy and benchmark programs of a similar nature.<br> <br> <em><u>Risk</u></em>: While it appears that TMRR phase schedule Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) performance, cost, and schedule objectives are more or less achievable, the potential Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) and Production & Deployment (P&D) phase risks are effectively unknown at this point due to the large number of Complexity challenges being addressed during TMRR.<br> <br> <u>ICR Observe/Orient Assessment</u>: MHU<br> <br> <strong><em>Portfolio of Programs</em></strong><br> <br> A Program Executive Officer (PEO) level Observe/Orient evaluation of his/her portfolio of acquisition programs at any given time would normally be conducted at a less detailed level. As a result, one would expect to see initial analysis results for the portfolio of programs along these Importance/Complexity/Risk (ICR) lines: <ul> <li>LLL – A group of simple, routine programs that PMs within the PEO are managing effectively</li> <li>LMH – A group of programs with some functional areas that require extra PM management efforts and PEO-level monitoring</li> <li>MHM – A small group of challenging, high profile programs* that require intensive PM-level management and PEO-level oversight</li> <li>UUH – One or two unprecedented programs that, at least at this point, are beyond the ability of the PM and PEO staff to effectively evaluate due to lack of expertise and experience</li> </ul> <br> * Note that in this example, the PEO assessed the PM’s TMRR phase program as “MHH” (rather than "MHU") based on the PEO’s experience with other similar programs.<br> <br> <strong>Typical Observations & Findings</strong><br> <br> As you can see from the proceeding examples, the “where you stand depends upon where you sit” principle normally applies to these types of initial Observe/Orient analyses. PM-level analyses typically focus on the more detailed set of activities within their span of control and knowledge, while the PEO-level analyses generally focus on higher levels of abstraction based the comparison and contrasting of the various programs within the PEO’s portfolio.<br> <br> Despite these differences, the PM and PEO – and their supporting Integrated Product Team (IPT) and PEO staff experts – should strive to use the same overall Observe/Orient analytical approach in their respective assessments. Using the same Observe/Orient approach helps facilitate “crucial conversations” at all levels regarding the most critical acquisition challenges that deserve the most PM and PEO-level management attention.<br> <br> Once their Observe/Orient analyses are completed, PMs and PEOs should be in a much better position to organize and plan future efforts -- and allocate the scare resources they can control (or obtain) – to tackle the acquisition challenges in their domain that have the highest payoff.<br> <br> <strong>Acquisition Improvements – Deciding and Acting</strong><br> <br> So here’s the promised Synthesis of our discussion regarding how to more effectively and efficiently tacke challenging acquisition problems: <ol> <li><strong>Avoid</strong> the “Ready – Fire – Aim” syndrome by conducting an OODA Loop Observe/Orient analyses first to identify the most important challenges out there in your acquisition environment. <ol> <li>Start out by using local knowledge/expertise and online but …</li> <li>Don’t hesitate to seek out external advice from higher levels in the chain-of command, peer organizations, and other subject matter experts (DAU comes to mind!) to resolve General Colin Powell’s “level of knowledge” questions.</li> </ol> </li> <li><strong>Conduct</strong> Observe/Orient analyses to help pick the right “Tool(s)” to help solve the challenge(s) you’re facing: <ol> <li>Use of <strong>Best Practices</strong> – including Tailoring** and Lessons Learned – for programs facing typical, known acquisition problems other have tackled (and successfully resolved.</li> <li>Use of <strong>Creativity and Innovation</strong> – which often requires cultural change as well as “permission to fail” – to address unknown or unprecedented acquisition challenges beyond known Best Practice boundaries.</li> </ol> </li> <li><strong>Decide</strong> where you are going to focus top-level management attention – and allocate the “time, talent, and treasure” problem-solving resources within your span of control (or beyond) – on the most important, toughest problems.</li> <li><strong>Act</strong> decisively to pursue your desired Course(s) of Action (COA(s)), but always remember that Colonel Boyd called it an <strong><em>OODA Loop</em></strong> for a reason. No plan ever survives contact with the enemy – in our community of practice “acquisition friction” – so continue to Observe and (if necessary) Re-Orient to achieve optimal acquisition outcomes.</li> </ol> <br> Until next time … Prof K<br> <br> ** There is an great article in the March-April 2018 <strong><em>Defense AT&L Magazine</em></strong> by DAU Professor Brian Schultz entitled “Please Tailor Your Acquisition Strategy!” that addresses Tailoring in this important area – check it out!</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/Critical-Thinking-and-Acquisition-Improvements
Making the Case for International Cooperative Programs the Case for International Cooperative Programs2018-01-05T17:00:00Z, F-35 Streamers_20170223.jpg<div class="ExternalClass45BBEEDCE0DF4926B9E7AB03B810500F">As a result of Administration and Congressional emphasis on the subject, I have focused on several Security Cooperation topics over the past several blogs. Many people are unaware that Security Cooperation -- as defined in DoD Directive 5132.03 -- also includes “International Armaments Cooperation” as well as “Equipment Sales and Training” efforts.<br> <br> This blog addresses a question many International Acquisition community members have been asking for the past several years, “when is DoD going to take action to establish a new generation of International Cooperative Programs (ICPs)?”<br> <br> <strong>ICP Basics</strong><br> <br> What is the primary difference between ICPs versus Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) arrangements, which are both more prevalent and well-known? It’s actually quite simple. FMS and DCS are “seller-buyer” relationships, with the U.S. (either government or industry) acting as the seller and foreign governments or industry acting as the buyer. ICPs, on the other hand, are defense acquisition “partnership” arrangements with allied and friendly nations.<br> <br> ICPs are established through international agreements – commonly referred to as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or Project Arrangements (PAs) -- rather than through FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) or DCS contracts. The U.S. laws, regulations, and policies that govern ICP arrangements are also completely separate from those that govern FMS and DCS transactions.<br> <br> Moreover, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L), rather than USD (Policy), is responsible for oversight and management of ICPs. <em>(Note: the details of how this responsibility will be ‘split’ between the new USD (Acquisition and Sustainment) and USD (Research and Engineering) positions after February 1, 2018 is yet to be determined.)</em><br> <br> <strong>A Brief History</strong><br> <br> ‘Back in the day’ identification and establishment of new ICPs was a top priority within the Department of Defense.<br> <br> <strong><em>First Steps</em></strong>: While there were a few ICPs established in the 60s and 70s – most notably NATO SeaSparrow – the first big push to establish defense acquisition partnership arrangements occurred in the 80s. Senators Sam Nunn and Dan Quayle sponsored new legislative authorities for establishment of ICPs in Title 10 and Title 22 of the U.S. Code. Senator Nunn also took action to provide a substantial amount of “seed money” in defense appropriations bills to provide funding to encourage DoD Components to start new ICPs with allied and friendly nations, primarily in Europe and the Pacific Rim. Unfortunately, the results from this initial era of cooperation were decidedly mixed. While most of the Science and Technology (S&T) programs and projects with allied and friendly nations were successful, some of the highly publicized new start cooperative acquisition programs -- including NATO Frigate Replacement (NFR) 90 -- failed to complete development and enter into production and deployment for various reasons.<br> <br> <strong><em>Evolution and Maturation</em></strong>: Fortunately, DoD’s ICP specialists learned quite a bit from these initial successes and failures, and worked with the DoD S&T community and acquisition Program Managers to develop several new ICP strategies and international agreement practices. These innovations led to successful negotiation, signature, and implementation of numerous S&T and acquisition programs at all Acquisition Category (ACAT) levels from the 1990s onward. The most well-known ICP established during this era is Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), but there are many others:<br> <br> <strong><em>Army</em></strong>: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), M982 Excalibur<br> <strong><em>Navy</em></strong>: AV-8B Harrier II Plus, MK-48 Torpedo, P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft<br> <em><strong>Air Force</strong></em>: Wideband Global Satellite, NATO C-17, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance<br> <strong><em>Missile Defense Agency</em></strong>: SM-3 Block IIA, David’s Sling, Ballistic Missile Defense Framework Partnerships<br> <br> While they have not received as much media attention as U.S. FMS and DCS activity in recent years, the ICPs established with allies and friends since the 1990s have played a key role in achieving DoD’s Security Cooperation goals and objectives.<br> <br> <strong>Comparative Advantages</strong><br> <br> Similar to other forms of Security Cooperation in the equipment and logistics area – most notably FMS and DCS -- ICPs provide the U.S. and its allies and friends with overall benefits such as: <ul> <li>Improving coalition interoperability</li> <li>Achieving acquisition economies of scale in production and operations & support phases</li> <li>Helping the U.S. maintain a viable production base</li> <li>Fair sharing production line shutdown costs at the end of a program’s life-cycle</li> </ul> <br> ICPs, however, provide several additional technological and economic advantages beyond those achieved through FMS and DCS including: <ul> <li>Establishing solid partner nation(s) commitments for new or modified systems early in development</li> <li>Sharing upfront development (investment) costs for both S&T and acquisition programs</li> <li>Gaining access to (and using) leading-edge foreign technology to improve performance and enhance overall affordability throughout the acquisition life-cycle</li> <li>Fair sharing production non-recurring costs</li> <li>Fair sharing sustaining engineering & logistics costs</li> <li>Fair sharing system product improvement costs</li> </ul> <br> <strong><em>Quantitative Impact</em></strong>: The quantitative economic benefits, in terms of U.S. and allied/friendly nation ICP contributions, have been substantial. The initial set of JSF ICP agreements led to over 4 ½ billion dollars in investment from eight partner nations during JSF’s development phases. Under the current JSF ICP Memorandum of Understanding (which entered into effect in December 2006), JSF production, sustainment, and follow-on development non-recurring costs from 2006 to 2051 have been (and will be) shared on a proportional basis with the U.S. funding ~75% and the other eight partner nations funding ~25%. Moreover, U.S. and partner JSF aircraft and sustainment procurement recurring buys have -- and will likely to continue to -- occur in approximately the same proportion, providing all nine partners with substantial (if as yet uncalculated) economic order quantity savings. Based on JSF’s overall ~$400 billion acquisition and ~$1.1 trillion operations and support cost estimates, this means that overall investment by the eight JSF partner nations to develop, acquire, and sustain a leading edge, coalition-ready air dominance capability will be ~$375B by the middle of this century.<br> <br> JSF is not the only ICP program that has provided substantial economic benefits. Between 2011 and 2016 the Army, Navy, and Air Force entered into 478 ICP international agreements – mostly in the S&T, product improvement, and sustainment areas -- with a total program value of $27.6 billion. The U.S. contributions to these ICPs are valued at $22.6B while allied/friendly nation contributions total $5B. These amounts are substantially smaller than the amount of FMS and DCS sales made during this time period, which total tens of billions per year (e.g., ~$42B in 2017). However, these ICP statistics <u>do</u> <u>not</u> <u>include</u> DoD “Fourth Estate” ICP contributions (which were not collected) nor the production, sustainment, and product improvement recurring values from ongoing ICP programs since DoD has been unable to find a way to easily and accurately calculate them.<br> <br> Notwithstanding these challenges, estimating the approximate economic value of ICPs beyond what is currently being tracked by DoD is possible. Using known JSF and P-8 aircraft/sustainment recurring purchases by partner nations in recent years, plus Missile Defense Agency and other Fourth Estate ICP statistics from this period, a conservative estimate would be $5B per year. When these estimates are added to already known amount of partner contributions during this timeframe, the combined partner investment and recurring purchases through ICPs over the past 5 years total $30B or more, a substantial sum.<br> <br> <strong><em>Qualitative Impact</em></strong>: While ICP economic impacts throughout the acquisition life-cycle are impressive, there are strong arguments that their qualitative benefits are even more important in the long run. Here are four areas where successful ICPs excel in achieving optimal DoD Security Cooperation outcomes on a program-by-program basis:<br> <br> <u>Burden Sharing</u>: ICPs require early investment by the U.S. and partner nations – which means risk sharing and up-front commitment by all – in the development of new defense technologies and capabilities. While the amount of early partner investment in absolute terms is normally small – from less than a million to the low 10s of millions of dollars – successful ICPs grow into future capabilities acquired and used by the U.S. and partner nations throughout the acquisition life-cycle. One early S&T ICP with NATO partners – Communications Systems Network Interoperability – led to cooperative international testing and maturation of the ARPAnet (the precursor to the internet). A $165M R&D investment – split equally ($55M each) by the U.S., Italy, and Spain – led to the integration of the APG-65 (F-18) radar into the AV-8B, which was ultimately acquired and fielded by all three nations. Most JSF partner nations -- excepting the U.K., which contributed $200M – only invested $10M in JSF’s initial Concept Demonstration Phase conducted from 1997-2001. Yet, as noted above, this initial investment led to a $4.5B partner contribution later in JSF development as well as future billions of dollars of JSF production, sustainment, and follow-on development spending on a leading edge, coalition-ready, interoperable defense capability.<br> <br> <u>Defense Exportability</u>: One of the biggest challenges DoD faces today is how to achieve defense exportability as early as possible in our new start or major modification programs. This is a two-pronged issue: <ol style="list-style-type:lower-alpha;"> <li>Which defense exportability features should be incorporated into a new/modified system to make it ready for future export?</li> <li>Since the development of such defense exportability features costs money early in development, who should pay?</li> </ol> <br> Defining exportability requirements has always a tough policy and technical problem; one that U.S. Government (USG) Technology Security & Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) processes would rather defer until as late in the development process is possible since having a defined system configuration makes TSFD decision much simpler. Unfortunately, this approach has always been problematic since -- once development on a “U.S. Only” version system is largely completed -- there are significant redesign and redevelopment cost and schedule impacts associated with modifying our version to achieve FMS exportable configurations.<br> <br> Even if TSFD policy is established as part of a U.S.-funded exportability feasibility study conducted early in development, who should pay the “big ticket” exportability modification costs during (or after) the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase? The tax payers? U.S. industry? ‘Launch’ FMS or DCS customers?<br> <br> ICPs solve this problem since early partner commitment – including investment in the new system’s development – provide both the motivation for the USG TSFD processes to develop specific exportability policy guidance and the funds needed to pay for exportability design and development. While the mechanics of this can be a bit complex, the fact is that ICPs – by definition – must develop a system that is exportable to all of the partner nations in future production and sustainment phases. As a result partner participation and investment in the ICP also sets the stage for U.S. sales of ICP-developed systems to non-partner nations via FMS or DCS (depending on USG sales policy for the system) in early production.<br> <br> There are many examples of this beginning with NATO SeaSparrow, Multifunction Information Distribution System (MIDS), Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) (Global Hawk), and many other ICPs. More recently, U.S. and partner nation JSF ICP efforts provided a basis for early, affordable acquisition of JSF aircraft by current FMS customers (Israel, Japan, and South Korea) as well as other interested FMS purchasers.<br> <br> <u>Acquisition Planning and Contracting</u>: All ICP international agreements have a Management section which establishes a mutually agreed executive and program management level structure for cooperative acquisition decision making and execution. They also contain a Contractual Arrangements section that establishes mutually agreed arrangements for U.S. and partner nation efforts to contract for U.S. and partner nation requirements. Other ICP international agreement sections govern key areas such as Financial Matters, Disclosure and Use of Information, and Security. As a result, U.S. and partner ICP acquisition requirements are planned and implemented in manner that optimizes combined buys. This achieves consistent economic order quantity savings outcomes for all partners throughout the program’s life-cycle. While many programs attempt to optimize U.S. and FMS customer procurement requirements that arise during a program’s life-cycle in a similar manner-- and occasionally succeed – they are often unable to achieve desired results due to lack of a mutually agreed structure and set of business practices for doing so. ICPs solve this problem.<br> <br> <u>Global Competitiveness</u>:<br> <br> ICPs provide a unique way for the USG and industry to compete in the global defense marketplace. ICP international agreements create an initial set of partners willing to invest in and acquire a newly developed capability. Moreover, ICPs have already resolved exportability issues and established an efficient program management and contracting organization ready address potential FMS customer requirements. That is why ICPs like NATO SeaSparrow, MIDS, RAM, JSF, and many others have been so successful in promoting FMS sales of cooperatively-developed and produced systems and equipment.<br> <br> While they are not established for this purpose, experience has shown that successful ICPs provide the U.S. and its partner nations with several unique advantages in ‘head to head’ global competitions with other nations’ products. In the case of the JSF ICP initiative, eight of the nine development partners have already purchased (or decided to purchase) JSF aircraft. The ninth partner (Canada) is still considering JSF as an option to meet its future fighter aircraft requirements. As noted above, three other nations have already purchased JSF via FMS, and several others are considering it. No other current fighter aircraft has achieved this level of success in global competitions over the past decade.<br> <br> <strong>Where are Tomorrow’s ICPs?</strong><br> <br> With such an impressive record of success, one would think that pursuit of future ICPs would be among DoD’s top priorities. Even DoD Directive 5000.01 – the acquisition ‘bible’ – lists establishment of ICPs for new systems as THE preferred development alternative (in theory, a better choice than U.S. joint service and DoD Component-unique new start programs).<br> <br> The fact is (and has always been) that it’s substantially harder to establish an ICP for developing a new system rather than conducting a U.S.-only development at taxpayer expense and hoping for future sales. If you are interested in learning more about the challenges in establishing ICPs, consider reading the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) paper on <a href="">“Designing and Managing Successful International Joint Development Programs”</a> published in January 2017.<br> <br> From a broader historical perspective, however, the challenges outlined in the CSIS study have always existed in some form. You don’t have to be an expert to recognize that, in most cases, it’s harder to establish a partnership than make a sale. Moreover, some DoD programs just don’t lend themselves to effective partnering with allies and friends. Despite these challenges, DoD advocated establishment of ICPs on specific programs as an integral part of their acquisition strategy – despite the risks and potential problems – in the 90s and 00s. We are reaping the benefits of these ICPs now, and will continue to do so well into the future.<br> <br> However, DoD’s current Security Cooperation approach favors defense sales versus establishment of new start ICPs. Since 2010 only a few new major system ICPs have been established as compared to the previous decades. Why?<br> <br> <strong>Expanded ICP Policy? </strong><br> <br> Organizations attempting to change the status quo often focus on reforming existing policies and processes rather than identifying “what’s missing?” The new Administration is already pursuing several lines of effort to improve DoD’s FMS performance in well-known areas. However, a strong argument can be made that -- despite the fact that the FMS reforms being pursued are sorely needed -- they will be unable to achieve enhanced DoD acquisition outcomes across the entire spectrum of DoD’s acquisition activities.<br> <br> While promoting defense sales is DoD’s current Security Cooperation preference in the current environment, putting “all our eggs in this basket” is not our only option. We don’t have to fund S&T, rapid acquisition, and new system development costs all by ourselves, assume full technology maturation and development risks, then wrestle with all-to-predictable exportability and contracting problems when we try to sell new and modified systems developed for solely for U.S. use. There is another alternative.<br> <br> Experience has shown that the current set of ICPs has served us well. These ICPs have -- and are continuing to -- provide substantial benefits to the U.S. and its allies and friends throughout the acquisition life-cycle. Looking forward, our current Security Cooperation reform efforts could be clearly benefit from the establishment of new ICPs with key allies and friends in selected areas. Use of ICP initiatives early in development provides a solid foundation for future defense sales after our systems have successfully completed testing and evaluation, then transitioned into full scale production, deployment, and initial sustainment activities. Many of the challenges inherent in future FMS for our new systems could be avoided by intelligent use of ICPs as a complementary Security Cooperation option.<br> <br> Shouldn’t DoD consider establishing a new generation of ICPs, starting today?<br> <br> <br> Until next time … Prof K</div>string;#/training/career-development/intl-acq-mgmt/blog/Making-the-Case-for-International-Cooperative-Programs