

neous programs in order to make the commitment necessary for the programs we choose to pursue.

Consequences No. 5 and No. 8, when taken together, address the User fears noted as Roadblock 8, earlier in the article. Programs not being allowed to mature to a necessary level will be a real problem if the people and institutions responsible for strategic vision and budget (everyone from agency headquarters staff to Congress) don't have a good understanding of what EA is about and the purposes and goals of the particular program acquisition strategies that will result.

Still a Few Bugs in the System

A few things can still cause us to stumble. The biggest problem is the time necessary to get the money for these programs into the POM cycle. A sufficiently

large wedge placed in the POM as soon as a need is identified will help matters. However, we have to realize that when we place that wedge in the POM, it isn't going to be even a SWAG (*Sophisticated Wild A - - - Guess*).

For that reason, teams need to have freedom to adjust that amount when planning is sufficiently far along. And, unless the budgeting cycle can adjust to the changes in a reasonable amount of time, we are going to be attempting to accomplish things without the proper resources. Because of Consequence No. 10, having too much money set aside as a wedge may be as big a problem as having too little.

Another problem is that we will be developing acquisition strategy prior to completing the ORD. This is really just a consequence, as opposed to a stum-

bling block. But if we cannot overcome the mindset that we need firm requirements before creating an acquisition strategy, we could seriously impact the capacity that EA has to reduce the time needed to field items.

Evolutionary Acquisition holds a lot of promise. It will not necessarily be appropriate for all acquisitions, and one of the most serious mistakes made is that we try to force everything into the same mold. EA will mean new mindsets and a lot of work, especially as we try to get it right. The first few efforts may easily fail, but commitment and innovation will eventually make it worth the effort and frustration.

Editor's Note: Slate welcomes questions or comments on this article. Contact him at alex.slate@brooks.af.mil.

IN MEMORIAM

Charles Joseph "Chuck" Tringali

The Defense Acquisition University has received word of the death of Charles Joseph "Chuck" Tringali on March 20. Chuck was past president of the Defense Systems Management College Alumni Association (DSMCAA, now DAUAA) and an active participant in DAU-DSMC activities for many years.

A retired Air Force colonel and recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross, Chuck commanded and made operational the first nuclear-armed "Thor" ICBM missile site in the United Kingdom; and completed 149 combat missions in Southeast Asia as a Command pilot flying highly classified unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. Chuck was also team leader



of the flight crew for Project Apollo. He later produced the initial concept documents and helped to start the Space Shuttle Office at the Pentagon.

A former executive of Lockheed Martin Corporation, Chuck served as Senior Director, Intelligence Group, Space and Strategic Missiles Sector, Washington Operations. He was a graduate of DSMC's Program Management Course (PMC 76-2), and was the first recipient of the DSMCAA David D. Acker Award for Skill in Communication in 1992.

Chuck was interred at Arlington National Cemetery April 15. He is survived by his wife of 42 years, his son, daughter, and two grandchildren.