



***DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY***

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***MAY 13, 2004***


# FORCE PLANNING PARADIGM SHIFT

## FROM 2 MTW TO CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCE

PA&E DRAFT




**Early 90s**



- Reduction of Cold War Forces
- Changed force size, not shape

*Threat Based*

**QDR 1997**



- Shape/Prepare no longer lesser included
- Forces not resized to strategy, leading to mismatch



*Capabilities Based*



# *QDR OPERATIONAL GOALS*

- Protecting critical bases of operations (U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and friends) and defeating CBRNE weapons and their means of delivery;
- Assuring information systems in the face of attack and conducting effective information operations;
- Projecting and sustaining U.S. forces in distant anti-access or area-denial environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats;
- Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high-volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains;
- Enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and
- Leveraging information technology and innovative concepts to develop an interoperable, joint C4ISR architecture and capability that includes a tailorable joint operational picture.




# Balancing Risks

Operational Risk	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Force Management Risk</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b><u>Definition:</u></b> Challenge of sustaining personnel, infrastructure and equipment</li> <li>▪ <b><u>Risk Mitigation Examples</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Manage careers and rotations</li> <li>▪ Modernize infrastructure and facilities</li> <li>▪ Training, spares and overall readiness</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b><u>Definition:</u></b> Challenge of deterring or defeating near-term threats</li> <li>▪ <b><u>Risk Mitigation Examples</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Plan and prosecute war on terror</li> <li>▪ Elevate role of homeland defense</li> <li>▪ Develop forward deterrence posture</li> <li>▪ Enhance operational capabilities with Allies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Future Challenges Risk	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Future Challenges Risk</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b><u>Definition:</u></b> Challenge of dissuading, deterring, defeating longer-term threats</li> <li>▪ <b><u>Risk Mitigation Examples</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Experiment with new concepts, capabilities and organizational designs</li> <li>▪ Investing in transformational capabilities for portions of the force</li> <li>▪ Foster a spirit of innovation and risk taking</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Institutional Risk</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b><u>Definition:</u></b> Challenge of improving efficiency represented by unresponsive processes, long decision cycles, segmented information, etc.</li> <li>▪ <b><u>Risk Mitigation Examples</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Modernize financial management systems and approaches</li> <li>▪ Acquisition excellence initiatives</li> <li>▪ Improve planning and resource allocation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>


Recently released 2003 Annual Report Begins to Detail Framework



# Global Surge Force - CSGs



# Current Worldwide Basing



- Multiple Bases (HUB)
- Main Operating Base
- Forward Ops Base
- Forward Ops Location
- New or changed base


- # Personnel Stationed
- 30-300
  - 301-3000
  - 3001-10,000
  - 10,001-30,000
  - > 30,000

Source: June 2006 O&B 11:15

PA&E



# DoD Topline Comparisons




## Macro Budget Trends

- Compared to the FY 02 baseline (extended through FY 09), total proposed increase of ~ \$655 B <sup>1</sup>
  - ~ \$415 B through FY 07

<sup>1</sup> Extends FY 02 baseline through FY 09 at the rate of inflation.


<sup>2</sup> FY 02 Amended Budget (excludes FY 02 Supplemental)

President's Budget FYDP Projections vs. Actual Defense Budget FY80-05 (TY\$B)






### U.S. Unified Federal Budget Surplus/Deficit Projections FY02-FY13



# Federal Budget FY02-08

## Based on FY04 President's Budget Request






**SLIDE TO BE PROVIDED**

# U.S. POSITION & FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT



- EXTRAORDINARILY STRONG STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES;  
DOMINANCE OF HIGH-END CONVENTIONAL WARFARE HAS DRIVEN COMPETITORS  
OUT OF THIS AREA (BUT POSSIBLY INTO OTHERS)
- MAJOR UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT FUTURE COMPETITORS, THE CHARACTER OF  
FUTURE WARFARE/MILITARY COMPETITIONS, AND RADICAL CHANGES IN THE  
HUMAN SCIENCES
- SOME TRENDS AND PATTERNS ARE EVIDENT: RISE OF ASIA, RELATIVE DECLINE  
OF EUROPE
- CONTINUING WAR ON TERRORISM
- DEFENSE OF U.S. HOMELAND

# PB 04 Transformation Spending by Operational Goal



# The Desired End State




## Current Process

Repetitive, adversarial, and labor intensive.  
Produces best-in-the-world component forces,  
but is not as cost-effective as it should be.

Strategy
Planning
Resourcing
Execution

Moving to the end state  
requires a realignment of  
effort




Strategy
Planning
Resourcing
Execution & Accountability

## Desired End State

Streamlined, collaborative yet competitive,  
efficient process that produces fully  
integrated joint warfighting capabilities.

# “End State” Process



← - - - Joint Capability Categories Provide Common Effects-Based Framework - - - →

**Based on top-down guidance**

**Produce unified, resource-informed strategic direction**

**Conduct analysis to affect capability trades for warfighting and enterprise resources**  
**Identify needs, gaps, and overlaps**

**Assess alternative solutions to Joint needs**


**Ensure planning decisions are translated and communicated in the budget process**

**Combined program/budget review**

**Understand what outcomes are achieved for the resources provided**

**Conduct cross-DoD assessment of capability achievement**

# Strategic Planning Council



## Corporate Board of Directors that:


- **Drives strategy and frames major planning issues**
- **Reviews joint needs and solutions to ensure congruency with strategy**
- **Assesses feedback on execution performance**



## COCOM Integrated Priority Lists

- **Purpose:** to provide the SECDEF and CJCS a succinct statement of key capability shortfalls that could hinder the performance of assigned COCOM missions
  - Linked to a specific element of the guidance
  - Expressed in capability terms
  - No more than four pages
  - 54 enhancements requested in Nov 2003; 23 offsets proposed in Jan 2004
  - 17 enhancements; 14 offsets considered for JPG

### The FY06-11 Process





# Enhanced Planning Process


- **Purpose: to support decisions on major issues and to provide metrics and measures of sufficiency for other elements of the Defense program**
  - Continuous process involving all DoD analytic resources and activities
  - Results conveyed in fiscally-constrained Joint Programming Guidance
  - Issues reviewed by three-star group and SLRG
  - CoCom IPL items incorporated in process

## FY06-11 Issues

- Mobility Capabilities (C-17 Production Line)
- Net-Centric/Horizontal Integration (Netting the Force, Information Assurance, DISN Funding/C4 Governance, Horizontal Integration)
- Global Force Posture (Global Footprint, Global Force Management)
- Global Force Operations (Undersea Superiority, Joint Forcible Entry, MV-22 Enhancements)
- Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction




# Integrating Processes



# Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Process Methodology




## Concepts




## Potential Capability Improvement Areas

- Integrated Priority List
- Joint Quarterly Readiness Review
- Lessons Learned Analysis
- Service Programs
- Strategic Planning Guidance
- Range of Military Operations
- Joint Experimentation


## Joint Integrating Concept Assessment




## Resource Strategy



## Capability Roadmap



## Capability Assessment





# Four Years In The Two-Year Cycle

## Year 1: Review and Refinement

- Early National Security Strategy
- Restricted fiscal guidance
- Off-year DPG Limited POM/BES submissions
- Program, Budget, and Execution Review initializes the on-year DPG
- PB/Congressional

## Year 3: Execution of Guidance

- Restricted fiscal guidance
- Off-year DPG
- Limited POM/BES submissions
- Program, Budget, and Execution Review initializes the on-year DPG
- PB/Congressional Justification

## Year 2: Full PPBE Cycle –

### Formalizing the Agenda

- Quadrennial Defense Review
- Fiscal guidance issued
- On-year DPG (implementing QDR)
- POM/BES submissions
- Program, Budget and Execution Review
- PB/Congressional Justification

## Year 4: Full PPBE Cycle –

### Ensuring the Legacy

- Fiscal guidance issued
- On-year DPG (refining alignment of strategy and programs)
- POM/BES submissions
- Program, Budget and Execution Review
- PB/Congressional Justification



# V-22: Key Considerations

	<u>USMC</u>	<u>SOCOM</u>
<b>Capability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Faster force buildup (a product of speed/range/payload)</li> <li>• Self deployability</li> <li>• Survivability in an opposed assault</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to execute longer range infiltration/exfiltration/resupply missions in one period of darkness</li> <li>• Reduced need for penetrating tanker support</li> <li>• Self deployability</li> </ul>
	<p>V-22 designed to go beyond the capabilities of helicopters. But can the joint force exploit these capabilities?</p>	
<b>Cost/ Affordability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some helicopter alternatives would be cheaper (up to \$5B in acquisition costs (FY02\$))</li> <li>• Other helicopter alternatives are equal cost or more expensive</li> </ul>	
<b>Technical Risk</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4 crashes (1991, 1992, 1999, 2000)</li> <li>• Blue Ribbon Panel and Ames Research Center: Tiltrotor technology potentially successful</li> <li>• Test program on track but still in early stages – Flight test resumed in May 2002; significant insight into key safety issues by spring 2003</li> <li>• If test program fails, then only near- and mid-term alternatives are helicopters</li> </ul>	



## V-22: Capabilities Comparison & Assessment

	MV-22	Comparison	When would it be important?
Force Buildup	Long Range Missions: Raid, Land-to-Land Assault, Hostage Rescue, etc. (200nm)	V-22 could arrive 30 minutes sooner than helicopters.	Important for missions requiring limited numbers of light troops, exposed for a short period, when time between launch and arrival affects operational outcome – e.g., hostages being threatened. (Example: Mogadishu 1991)
	MEF/Multiple MEB Amphibious Assault (50nm)	V-22 fleet could move forces ashore: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>About 30 minutes (20%) faster than pure helicopter fleet</li> <li>About equally fast as V-22/helicopter mixed fleet</li> <li>About 60 minutes faster than current fleet</li> </ul> This relative performance holds out to 100nm.	Important if enemy forces were close enough to threaten landing zone and TacAir or other supporting assets could not attrite them or pin them down. (Example: Reactive threat in mountainous terrain, Korean scenario) (Note: Current Marine Corps planning focuses more on MEB-sized amphibious assaults/expeditionary operations than MEF-sized assaults)
	Point-to-Point (50nm) Logistics Support	The most efficient helicopter fleets could deliver the same tonnage in same time. Current fleet delivers about 20% of total tonnage.	Important when logistical demands strain capacity of available aircraft. (Example: Afghanistan or area with little infrastructure established)
Global Deployability	V-22's self-deployment capability could save 22% of force sorties (for a Marine Corps MPF MEB).	Important when strategic lift or time is limited or if faster reinforcement of forces afloat is needed. (Example: Desert Shield)	
Vulnerability/Survivability	V-22 designed to be more survivable than helicopters, advantage would be significant over CH-53.	Important if C4ISR cannot identify safe routes or if LZ is under fire. (Example: LZ X-Ray, Vietnam; Operation Anaconda)	
	CV-22		
Penetration in one period of darkness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CV-22 (500-750nm radius) v. Helicopter (264-420nm radius).</li> <li>Helicopters would require aerial refueling at the longer ranges .</li> </ul>	Important when launch bases are far behind friendly lines, when missions require deep penetration, or when enemy has significant air defense. (Example: Desert One) If helicopters cannot reach target, parachute delivery must be used instead. Extraction by foot or linkup.	

## *Summary – The New Process*



- Focuses on joint capabilities
- Assigns Combatant Commanders critical role in shaping Defense program
- Places additional emphasis on strategy and planning
- Imposes fiscal discipline early in process
- Creates feedback mechanism